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No.
THE MIAMI HERALD PUBLISHING OOMP ANY,
a division of
KNIGHT' NEWSPAPERS, INC.,
Appellant,

v.
PAT L. TORNILLO, JR.,
Appellee.

On Appe,al from the Supreme Court of Florida

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Appellant The Miami Herald Publishing Company, a
division of Knight Newspapers, Inc. ("The Miami Herald")
appeals from the judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida entered on July 18, 1973, rehearing denied October 10,
1973, which reversed a decision of the Circuit Court of

2
Dade County, Florida and upheld the constitutionality of
Section 104.38, Florida Statutes. This Jurisdictional Statement is submitted to show that the Supreme Court has
jurisdiction of this Appeal and that substantial constitutional questions are presented which merit review by this
Court.

OPINION BELOW
The initial opinion of the Florida Supreme Court
dated July 18, 1973 and the opinion denying rehearing
dated October 10, 1973 are not yet reported. The opinion
of the Circuit Court of Dade County is reported at 38
Fla. '8upp. 80 (1973). Copies of these three opinions are
included in the Appendix to this Statement.
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JURISDICTION
This action was brought by Appellee Pat L. Tornillo,
Jr. ("Tornillo") against The Miami Herald for a mandatory injunction directing The Miami Herald to print
verbatim a statement by Appellee and for damages based
upon an alleged violation of Section 104.38, Florida Statutes, a criminal statute. On October 20, 1972, the Circuit
Court for Dade County dismissed the Complaint, holding
Section 104.38, Florida Statutes, to be in violation of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, and Article I of the Florida Constitution.
Tornillo appealed directly to the Florida Supreme Court
on November 3, 1972, and that Court reversed the decision
of the Circuit Court and upheld the constitutionality of
Section 104.38, Florida Statutes, in an opinion dated
July 18, 1973. The Miami Herald filed a Petition for
Rehearing, which was denied by the Supreme Court of
Florida on October 10, 1973. The Miami Herald filed a
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Notice of Appeal on November 1, 1973. A copy of the Notice
of Appeal is included in the Appendix to this 'Statement.
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States
to review this decision by direct appeal is conferred by
Title 28, U.S.C., Section 1257 (2). Although the Supreme
Court of Florida remanded this case to the trial court for
further proceedings, the opinion and judgment of the
Florida Supreme Court are final for purposes of 28 U.S.C.
§1257 (2). The Florida Supreme Court conclusively decided
the controlling constitutional issue, and its decision, which
is binding upon the trial court, is therefore reviewable by
this Court. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966); Hudson
Distributors v. Lilly & Co., 377 U.S. 386 (1964); Mercantile National Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555 (1963).
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Does Section 104.38, Florida Statutes, abridge freedom
of the press and due process of law in violation of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution by compelling a newspaper to provide free
space, under criminal sanctions, to a candidate in any state
election to reply to any publication in the newspaper which
"assails [his] personal character," or charges him with
"malfeasance or misfeasance" in office, or "otherwise
attacks his official record"?
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in part:
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press. . . ."

",,
4
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides, in part:
" ... No State shall ... deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.... "
The principal statute involved in this case is Section
104.38, Florida Statutes, which is part of the Florida
Election Code:
"§104.38 Newspaper assailing candidate in an
election; space for reply. - I f any newspaper in
its columns assails the personal character of any
candidate for nomination or for election in any
election, or charges said candidate with malfeasance or misfeasance in office, or otherwise attacks
his official record, or gives to another free space
for such purpose, such newspaper shall upon request of such candidate immediately publish free
of cost any reply he may make thereto in as conspicuous a place and in the same kind of type as
the matter that calls for such reply, provided
such reply does not take up more space than the
matter replied to. Any person or firm failing to
comply with the provisions of this section shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree,
punishable as provided in §775.082 or §775.083."
Sections 775.082 (5) and (6) and 775.083, which
provide criminal sanctions for violations of §104.38, Fla.
Stat., are reproduced in the Appendix to this Statement, together with Sections 97.021 (1)- (4) and (18),
which define the terms "election" and "candidate", as used
in Section 104.38. No other terms contained in Section
104.38 are defined in the Florida Election Code.

5
Section 770.02, Fla. Stat., is a retraction statute wl
limits a plaintiff in a libel action to actual damages wh
upon plaintiff's request, the publisher of the alleged def
atory statement prints a retraction. This Statute is
in the Appendix to this Statement.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In the fall of 1972, Tornillo was a candidate for
Democratic Party nomination for a seat in the Flo:r
House of Representatives. On September 20, 1972 and S
tember 29, 1972, The Miami Herald published editori
relating to Tornillo's candidacy. Copies of these editori
appear in the Appendix to this Statement.

On September 30, 1972, Tornillo requested The Mia
Herald to print verbatim and free of cost a statement s1
mitted by Tornillo, purportedly in reply to the editori
pursuant to Section 104.38, Florida Statutes. The Mia
Herald did not print the material submitted by Tornil
Tornillo did not request a retraction pursuant to §770.(
Fla. Stat., or otherwise claim that the editorials were lib
ous, untrue, or inaccurate.

On October 1, 1972, Tornillo filed a civil action
the Circuit Court for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit seeki1
to require The Miami Herald to publish his "reply," and
obtain damages. Circuit Judge Francis J. Christie held
emergency hearing on the matter on October 2, 1972. T
Attorney General was notified of the suit pursuant
§86.091, Fla. Stat., requiring notice of any action in whi<
a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional, and was rep
sented at the hearing.

\.

,,

7
6

At the hearing, the Court was advised that the AttorV General had refused to appeal a decision by Volusia
unty Judge J. Robert Durden which had held §104.38
constitutional, because the Attorney General himself had
:ervations about the constitutionality of the statute.
at case, State v. News-Journal, 36 Fla. Supp. 164 (VoluCounty, Fla., Judges Ct. 1972) was apparently the
st case brought under §104.38 since its enactment in
L3. A copy of the opinion in that case is contained in the
pendix to this Statement. The Attorney General advised
lge Christie that his opinion was unchanged since the
ws-Journal case, and that he continued to have doubts
the constitutionality of §104.38, and therefore would
defend the statute.

At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Christie or·ed Tornillo's case dismissed with prejudice, holding the
tute void on its face as an impermissible restriction upon
edom of speech and press in violation of the First and
1rteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
.tes and, in addition, denied due process of law under
Fourteenth Amendment because of its vagueness and
biguity.
Tornillo appealed the judgment of the Circuit Court
:!ctly to the Supreme Court of Florida. The Attorney
1eral of Florida filed a brief urging affirmance of the
cuit Court's decision. Amicus curiae briefs urging affirnce of the Circuit Court's judgment were also filed by
American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, Inc. and
1es Publishing Company, publisher of two daily newsers, the St. Petersburg Times and the St. Petersburg
ependent. Donald U. Sessions, an attorney acting on his
1 behalf, filed an amicus curiae brief urging reversal.

On July 10, 1973, the Supreme Court of Florida
rendered an Opinion, per curiam, which reversed the Circuit Court and upheld the validity of §104.38, Fla. Stat.,
finding that the statute did not violate the Constitutions
of the United States or of Florida. One Justice dissented.
On August 2, 1973, The Miami Herald filed a Petition
for Rehearing. Twenty-two Florida newspaper publishers
filed amicus .£!!riae briefs urging the Court to grant the
Petition and reverse its initial decision. The Attorney / )
General of Florida filed a second Brief advancing similar
views.
The Petition for Rehearing was denied in a per curiam
opinion dated October 10, 1973, one Justice again dissenting. On November 1, 1973, The Miami Herald filed a
Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court of the United
States.

THE QUESTIONS ARE SUBSTANTIAL
Introduction

This appeal involves the constitutionality of a novel
form of governmental regulation of the press which is
ostensibly designed to promote fairness in elections, but
which in fact represents a severe restraint upon the exer-cise of journalistic discretion by putting the government in
the editor's chair. In essence, the Florida statute in question
conditions a newspaper's right to print editorials, news
stories, advertising, or any other matter bearing unfavorably upon political candidates by requiring that such
matter is printed, the newspaper must offer the

',.

8 '

candidates free space for a "reply." Violations of the statute are punishable as misdemeanors of the first degree.
The Florida Supreme Court has also held that the statute
may be invoked as the basis for a private action for mandatory injunction and damages.
The issues presented by this case have fundamental
and far-reaching implications. Tornillo has asserted that
the Florida statute is not only consistent with the First
Amendment, but essential to providing him and others similarly situated with a means of publicly expressing their
political views. Tornillo has sought to bring himself within
the ambit of the Federal Communications Act's fairness
doctrine and the personal attack rules of the Federal Communications Commission, urging that these doctrines can
and should be applied to newspapers.
By contrast, The Miami Herald's position below and
before this Court is that the "right of reply" statute
represents an abridgement of a basic and vital constitutional protection provided to the press by the First Amendment. By its terms, the statute imposes governmental controls on editorial decisions to publish critical stories about
political candidates. Such controls directly threaten journalistic integrity and weaken freedom of expression. The
per curiam decision of the Supreme Court of Florida upholding the reply statute is thus in fundamental and irreconcilable conflict with the principles underlying this
Court's decision in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
Democratic National Committee, __ U.S. __, 36
L.Ed.2d 772 (1973) and the decisions of other courts.
Governmental regulation of the content of newspapers by
requiring publication, in the absence of compelling state

9

interests, is no less an unconstitutional restraint than
governmental prohibition upon publication. The attempted
analogy between newspapers and telecommunications media,
if upheld, would eradicate the long recognized distinction
between permissible regulation of print media and the
electronic media. Censorship of newspapers in the guise of
promoting fairness by requiring a right of "reply" or
"access" is, nevertheless, censorship. As such, it is the
exact opposite of the freedom of speech and press guaranteed by the First Amendment.
Even assuming that a State might legislate some form
of access to the press without violating the guarantees of
freedom of expression provided in the First Amendment,
the Florida criminal statute at issue in this case is inconsistent both with the First Amendment guarantees of a
free press and the due process rights in the Fourteenth
Amendment, because the statute is excessively broad,
vague, and ambiguous. The Florida Supreme Court attempted to cure some of the more obvious constitutional
defects in the statute through interpretation, but the effort
simply revealed more clearly the vices of the statute.
A.

The Florida Statute which Requires Requiring the Press to Publish a Reply as a Condition to Publishing Matter Critical of Political
Candidates Violates the First Amendment

1. The Decision below is in conflict with the rationale
of prior cas.es.
·-....

This Court has never ruled directly upon a
statute requiring newspaper publication of a "reply."'

10
fundamental question is whether the editorial discretion
of newspapers may be constitutionally circumscribed by
governmental regulation which compels publication. In
Columbia Broadcasting System, this Court held that a
broadcaster may not be forced to accept paid political advertising, concluding that governmental intrusion upon the
exercise of "journalistic discretion" to determine what
should or should not be published contravenes the "rigid
limitations" of the First Amendment. Similarly, other federal courts, including three Circuit Courts of Appeal, have
uniformly rejected any notion that the First Amendment
permits the adoption of governmental regulation which
compels a newspaper to publish material against its will.
The arguments advanced by Tornillo in the proceedings below were essentially similar to those made and
rejected in Chicago Joint Board, Amal. Cloth. Workers v.
Chicago Tribune Co., 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970). In
that case, the newspaper-ret"used to publish advertisements
submitted to it by the union, which presented the union's
views on a labor dispute in which it was engaged.
"It is urged that the privilege of First Amendment
protection afforded a newspaper carries with it
a reciprocal obligation to serve as a public forum,
and if a newspaper accepts any editorial advertising it must publish all lawful editorial advertisements tendered to it for publication at its established rates. We do not understand this to be
the concept of freedom of the press recognized in
the First Amendment. The First Amendment
guarantees of free expression, oral or printed,
exist for all . . . The Union's right to free speech

11
'
"
does not give it the right to make use of the defendants' printing presses and distribution systems without defendants' consent." ld. at 478.
The union's petition for certiorari was denied. 402 U.S.
973 (1971).
The constitutional issues involved in an attempt to
compel a newspaper to publish were also squarely faced
by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Associates &
Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133 (9th Cir.
1971). In that case, a movie distributor claimed that its
First Amendment rights were violated by the newspaper's
refusal to accept certain proffered advertising without
modifications requested by the newspaper. The Ninth Circuit firmly dismissed the would-be advertiser's claim of
infringement of First Amendment rights.
"Appellant has not convinced us that the Courts
or any other governmental agency should dictate
the contents of a newspaper." ld. at 135 (footnote om.).
A similar result was reached in A vins v. Rutgers,
State University of New Jersey, 385 F.2d 151 (3rd Cir.
1967). The plaintiff in that case sought to compel the
Rutgers Law Review to publish an article which it had
previously rejected. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the District Court's decision, refusing to order
publication even in a state-supported publication.
"The right to freedom of speech does not open
every avenue to one who desires to use a particu-

'1.
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lar outlet for expression ... Nor does freedom
of speech comprehend the right to speak on any
subject at any time . . . [Plaintiff] does not
have the right, constitutional or otherwise, to
commandeer the press and columns of the Rutgers
Law Review for the publication of his article, at
the expense of the subscribers to the Review and
the New Jersey taxpayers, to the exclusion of
other articles deemed by the editors to be more
suitable for publication. On the contrary, the
acceptance or rejection of articles submitted for
publication in a law school law review necessarily
involves the exercise of editorial judgment and
this is in no wise lessened by the fact that the law
review is supported, at least in part by the State."
I d. at 153-54.

question presented is exactly the same: whether newspapers may be required to publish (either as a "reply" or
directly), advertisements, editorials, and articles which in
the exercise of editorial judgment would not otherwise be
printed. Section 104.38, Fla. Stat., curtails the exercise of
journalistic discretion in the determination of what will
be published in exactly the same fashion as the demands
made in Columbia Broadcasting System, and kindred cases.
In terms of the exercise of editorial judgment and the
maintenance of journalistic integrity, the distinction between a demand for a "right of reply" such as that involved here and in Chicago Joint Board, Amal. Cloth.
Workers, supra, and for "access" such as that raised in
Avins, supra, is one without a difference. Both manifestly
require the suspension of editorial discretion and permit
the government through regulation to "commandeer the
press and columns" of newspapers and thereby dictate the
contents of those columns.

'Td, Resident Participation of Denver, Inc. v. Love,
F.Supp 1100 (D. Col. 1971). *

While the precise form of governmental regulation
~sue here may differ from that involved in Columbia
ulcasting System and the cases discussed above, the

•Without resorting to constitutional grounds, numerous other cases
rejected the concept that a newspaper should be considered to
"public utility" compelled to accept and publish all advertising
ered to it. E.g., McGiU v. State, 209 Ga. 500, 74 S.E.2d 78, 81·82
3); Chronicle & Gazette Pub. Co., Inc. v. Attorney General, 94
148, 48 A.2d 478, 482 (1946), appeal dismissed, 329 U.S. 690
7); Shuck v. Carroll Daily Herald, 215 Iowa 1276, 247 N.W. 813
3); In re Louis Wohl, 50 F.2d 254, 255 (E.D. Mich. 1931);
enburg v. Times Pub. Co., 170 La. 3, 127 So. 345 (1930);
hkeepsie Buying Service, Inc. v. Poughkeepsie Newspapers, Inc.,
Misc. 982, 131 N.Y.S.2d 515 (1954); see Associated Press v.
326 U.S.1, 19 (1945).

Columbia Broadcasting System and similar cases
unmistakably hold that deciding what to publish and what
not to publish rests within journalistic discretion which
is protected against any governmental intrusion by the
First Amendment. The Florida Supreme Court, upholding
the constitutionality of §104.38, Fla.Stat., espoused a
diametrically opposite view-that decisions by newspapers
as to what they will publish may be suspended or abridged
by governmental regulation. The Florida Supreme Court's
view of the protections accorded by the First Amendment
to newspapers in this case is in basic and irreconcilable
conflict with the scope of that protection as expressed in
Columbia Broadcasting System and kindred cases.

'
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2. Governmental regulations requiring publication
must meet the same constitutional standards as. regulations
prohibiting publication.

The Florida Supreme Court's decision conflicts with
the rationale of this Court in Columbia Broadcasting System because of its conclusion that regulations which
affirmatively require publication somehow stand on a
different constitutional footing than regulations prohibiting publication. The decision below rests in large measure
upon -this supposed distinction between these two types of
regulations. For example, the Florida Supreme Court
specifically states that §104.38, Fla. Stat., "does not consitute an incursion upon First Amendment rights or a
prior restraint, since no specified newspaper content is
excluded." (App. 8) (Emphasis in the original.) Thus,
the Florida Supreme Court concluded that the statute at
issue here, because it compels rather than prohibits publication, is not repugnant to the First Amendment.
The First Amendment admits of no such distinction.
As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Associates & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., supra, "There is
no difference between compelling publication of material
that the newspaper wishes not to print and prohibiting a
newspaper from printing news or other material." 440
F.2d at 135.
The majority of decisions in this Court which have
tested various statutes against the First Amendment guarantees have been in cases involving statutory restrictions
upon publication. Unless these restrictions have been justified by a clear and present danger to a compelling state

interest, the statutes have consistently been voided. E.g.,
Terminello v. Chic·ago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); Musser v. Utah,
333 U.S. 95 (1948) ; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
"The Government's power to censor the press
was abolished so that the press would remain forever free to censure the Government. The press
was protected so that it could bare the secrets of
government and inform the people. Only a free
and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government." New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (Justice Black
concurring) (1971).

Just as the First Amendment forbids unwarranted
censorship of the press which would prohibit or restrain
publication, a statute compelling a newspaper to publish
specific information also violates the First Amendment.
Both types of regulations "fetter" the maintenance of
journalistic integrity and affect "the impartial distribution
of news," Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 133
(1973). Thus in sustaining a decree forbidding monopolistic activities of a press association, this Court carefully pointed out that the decree did "not compel AP or its
members to permit publication of anything which their
'reason' tells them should not be published." Associated
Press v. U.S., supra at 20. Just as a State cannot prohibit
publication in the absence of a clear and present danger to
a compelling state interest, a state may not become an
editor and compel publication. "[L] iberty of the press is
in peril as soon as the government tries to compel what is
to go into a newspaper." II Chafee, Government and Mass

Communications 633 (1947).
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There is no compelling state irvterest which justifies the intrusions which the Florida statute makes upon
freedom of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment.
3.

First Amendment freedoms may not be impinged upon
unless there is a clear and present danger of a serious
substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience,
annoyance, or unrest. E.g., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
252, 262-63 (1941); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
Statutes prohibiting any type of publication, particularly
criminal statutes, are presumed unconstitutional unless it
can be demonstrated that the infringement is justified by
a "clear and present danger" to a critical public interest.
E.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) ; Associated Press v. U.S., supra at 7.
Although there is no available legislative history for
the 1913 Florida statute, the Supreme Court of Florida
discussed two possible objectives of the statute which were
used to justify its constitutionality. First, the Florida
Supreme Court cited a proper legislative purpose in ensuring fair elections. This objective is insufficient basis for
upholding the statute. This Court held in Mills v. Alabama,
supra, that the reasonableness of a state's interest in fair
elections cannot justify a criminal statute restricting the
contents of a newspaper. Mills was ignored by the Supreme
Court of Florida.
The second attempted justification of the statute was
as a counter to alleged monopolization and concentration in
the media. Even if the monopolization and concentration
issues had properly been before the Florida Supreme Court,
these issues would have provided no justification for up-

' ,,
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holding §104.38, Fla. Stat.* The Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts so ruled in a recent advisory opinion on
the constitutionality of a proposed right of access statute.
"The situation at which §39A [the proposed
statute] is directed may be the 'monopolistic
status' of certain news publications. However,
complusion to publish all responsive political advertisements, applicable to all newspapers and
other publications of general circulation in the
Commonwealth, goes beyond what is essential to
the furtherance of any interest of a State in its
citizens having a right of access to newspapers in
order to express, at their expense, political ideas
which otherwise would not be published. See Barron, Access to the Press - A New First Amendment Right, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1641, 1676-1678.
Indeed no set of circumstances may exist which
would support a legislative mandate that a newspaper or other publication of general circulation
must publish a political advertisement. The views
expressed and implied in the opinion of the court
and in the dissenting opinions in the Pittsburgh
Press Co. case, supa, [Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Committee on Human Relations,
__ U.S. __, 37 L.Ed.2d 669 (1973)] create
substantial doubt that such legislation would pass
*The Florida Supreme Court's contention on this issue went totally
beyond the issues raised by the Record in the case before that Court,
or the Briefs of the parties filed in that Court. The sole factual support
for the Court's contention was a magazine article appended to an
Amicus Curiae Brief filed by an attorney on his own behalf. The Florida Supreme Court had never before taken judicial notice of such an
article, much less given it substantive weight. In so doing, the Court
violated its own rules, and abridged fundamental due process.
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constitutional muster.". Opinion of the Justices,
298 N.E.2d 829, 835 (Mass. 1973) (footnote om.).

' that alleged concentration in the media can be
tention.
cured by a government fiat to be fair.

Similar arguments of lack of access were asserted in
Resident Participation of Denver, Inc. v. Love, supra, but
the three-judge Court rejected the contention that newspapers can constitutionally be required to furnish free
space for expression of views of citizens.
"We are aware that lack of access to those
media which reach large audiences has, some believe, given birth to a frustration which compels
otherwise peaceful citizens to engage in violence
to get their views to the nation. A cause of this
frustration, one critic maintains, is that, although
the courts have been vigorous in protecting free
speech, they have been indifferent to creating opportunities for expression. Barron, Access to the
Press- A New First Amendment Right, 80
Harv.L.Rev. 1641 (1967). We note, however, that
while Professor Barron spends considerable space
exploring a statutory solution to this problem, he
devotes much less attention to constitutional arguments and but one paragraph to the problem of
st.ate action, which we find insurmountable. Professor Barron simply concludes, without noticeable explanation, that newspapers can be subjected to the 'constitutional restrictions which
quasi-public status invites.' Id. at 1669. As desirable as this result might be, we are unable in
good faith to reach it." 322 F.Supp. at 1105.
The separate opinion of Justice Douglas in Columbia
Broadcasting likewise recognized and disposed of the con-

"Thomas I. Emerson, our leading First Amendment scholar has stated that
' . . . any effort to solve the broader problems
of a monopoly press by forcing newspapers to
cover all "newsworthy" events and print all viewpoints, under the watchful eyes of petty public
officials, is likely to undermine such independence
as the press now shows without achieving any real
diversity.' The System of Freedom of Expression
(1970), p. 671." U.S. at _ , 36 L.Ed.2d
at 811.
In addition to §104.38, there appear to have been
only two similar "right of reply" statutes enacted in the
United States. Miss. Code Ann. §3175 (1942) and Nev.Rev.
Stat. §200.570 (1963) .* The Mississippi statute was eviscerated in Manasco v. Walley, 63 So.2d 91 (Miss. 1953),
which held that the statute could be invoked only if the
publication concerning the candidate was libelous, even
though the statute by its terms is invoked by a publication
"reflect[ing] upon the honesty, integrity or moral character" of a candidate. ld. at 96. Nevada repealed its mandatory "right of reply" statute in 1969, and replaced it
*In addition, Wis. Stat. §895.05 provides that publication of a
reply in lieu of a retraction prohibits a recovery against a newspaper
in a defamation action other than actual damages. There is, further·
more, a fundamental difference between a right of retraction statute and
the right of reply statute at issue here: the former is permissive, miti·
,gating damages if a retraction is made and thus intended to encourage
freedom of expression; the reply statute by contrast, is mandatory, with
penal sanctions, and is designed to control the exercise of editorial
discretion.
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with a retraction statute. Ch. 310, Laws of Nevada,
Fifty-Fifth Session (Act of April 14, 1969). The paucity
of such legislation and the history of the few statutes
that have been enacted illustrates the lack of necessity
for "right of reply" or "access" to ensure that a diversity
of views and ideas are disseminated among the people.
Such legislation is inimical to our system of freedom of
expression. Nevertheless, if the decision of the Florida
Supreme Court is not reversed, it is likely that other States
will consider similar statutes in a misguided effort to
legislate fairness.
For these reasons, the solution to "the broader
problems of a monopoly press" do not lie, as the Florida
Supreme Court mistakenly conceived, in the imposition of
regulations which substitute the government for the editor
in the determination of what should be published. Indeed,
as the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts made
plain in its Opinion, supra, there are "no set of circumstances . . . which would support a legislative mandate
that a newspaper . . . must publish."
4. The Florida Supreme Court's attempted analogy
between permissible regulation of the press and of the
broadcast media is invidious.

Whatever continuing validity may inhere in the decision in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367
(1969), this Court's subsequent decision in Columbia
Broadcasting System leaves no doubt that the fairness
doctrine is applicable and constitutionally permissible,
if at all, solely and exclusively in the context of the broadcast media. It has long been recognized that differences
between the media may justify differences in the extent
to which First Amendment protection~ are accorded.

'
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Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). It may well be
that Red Lion, supra, represents the outer limit of permissible governmental regulation of the content of radio
and television station broadcasts, as this Court suggested
in Columbia Broadcasting System. In any event, as Professor Emerson points out in his discussion of the significance
of the Red Lion decision,
"Government regulation designed to promote the
system of freedom of expression takes on quite
a different cast when it is applied to media of
communication other than radio and television."
Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression
667 (1970).
The Florida Supreme Court's decision simply overlooks the fundamental constitutional distinction between
the broadcast media and the press. In a remarkable
analysis, the Court asserted that newspapers are subject to the same regulation as broadcast media because
newspapers make use of the airwaves in their operations
through telegraphs and other means of telecommunication.
(App. 18) Carried to its logical conclusion, this line of
reasoning would fully sustain, for example, regulations
requiring newspapers to be licensed before they begin
operations. That is precisely the sort of regulation which
the framers of the First Amendment fully intended to
forbid. The attempted analogy of the Court below between
the statute at issue here and the question presented in Red
Lion, supra, thus completely overlooks the fundamental
differences, both in technology and in First Amendment
principles, which exist between newspapers and the broadcast media.
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That such a distinction does exist and is sustained
on policy grounds is plain. It was recently reemphasized
by this Court in Columbia Broadcasting System, supra,
in the following language:
"The tensions inherent in such a regulatory
structure [of broadcasting] emerge more clearly
when we compare a private newspaper with a
broadcast licensee. The power of a privately
owned newspaper to advance its own political,
social, and economic views is bounded by only two
factors: first, the acceptance of a sufficient
number of readers - and hence advertisers to assur~ financial success; and, second, the
journalistic integrity of its editors and publishers." __ U.S. at __, 36 L.Ed.2d at 792.
In Columbia Broadcasting System, this Court went
on to say that the measure of freedom accorded to broadcasters is "not as large as that exercised by a newspaper."
ld. If broadcasters cannot constitutionally be compelled
to abdicate editorial discretion and accept material for
broadcast, it follows, a fortiori, that newspapers whose
range of discretion is even greater cannot be subjected
to regulation which requires them to publish materials
against their will.
The Columbia Broadcasting case was decided on May
29, 1973, after briefs had been submitted to the Florida
Supreme Court in this case, but the decision was promptly
called to the attention of that Court. Nevertheless, the
Florida Supreme Court did not even mention Columbia
Broadcasting in its per curiam opinion. Columbia
Broadcasting was mentioned only in the specially concur-

" opinion filed by Justice Roberts, in which five other
ring
members of the Court joined. Justice Roberts correctly
reasoned that the Columbia Broadcasting case was distinguishable due to the differences between broadcast and
other media. However, having distinguished broadcast
media from other media, Justice Roberts reached the
amazing conclusion that the press can be subjected to
even nwre regulation than the broadcast media. Justice
Roberts further asserted that the Court's per curiam
opinion, which rested heavily upon the Red Lion case, did
not conflict with Columbia Broadcasting, because Red Lion
was adhered to in the later decision. A distinction was
further discerned in that Columbia Broadcasting rejected
a requirement that broadcasters accept paid advertising
because, among other things, this would provide access
only to the affluent, whereas the Florida statute provides
access regardless of ability to pay. Such logic flies directly
in the face of the long-established constitutional principle
that the only basis for any regulation of the content of
broadcasting is its unique use of limited airwaves. E.g.,
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, supra; Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, supra; National Broadcasting Company v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943).
The difference, therefore, between regulation which
may be permissible in the context of radio and television
and that which is permitted with respect to the newspapers derives from the basic technology of the two media.
As this Court recognized long ago in National Broadcasting Company v. U.S., supra, the regulation of broadcasting
is virtually unavoidable since all who wish to speak over
the airwaves simply cannot be permitted to do so or none
will be heard. Whether the necessity of licensing broadcast
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stations and the technology limitations of the spectrum
are, of themselves, a sufficient ground to justify the
Fairness Doctrine is, in light of this Court's evolving
views as expressed in Columbia Broadcasting System, open
to question. In any case, the only grounds upon which the
Fairness Doctrine can be sustained is "the unique characteristics of electronic communication." Capital Broadcasting Co. v. John Mitchell, 333 F.Supp 582 (D.D.C. 1971),
aff'd 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
The direct conflict between the attempt by the Florida
Supreme Court to draw an analogy between the broadcast
and print media and this Court's views is illustrated by
the following excerpts from the Court's opinion in Columbia Broadcasting System:
" [ T] he broadcast media pose unique and special
problems not present in the traditional free speech
case. Unlike other media, broadcasting is subject
to an inherent physical limitation.... The Court
spoke to this reality when, in Red Lion, we said
'it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right
of every individual to speak, write, or publish.'
Red Lion, supra, 395 U.S., at 388." __ U.S.
at __ , 36 L.Ed.2d at 783.
*

*

*

"Nor can we accept the Court of Appeals view
that every potential speaker is 'the best judge'
of what the listening public ought to hear or indeed the best judge of the merits of his or her
views. All journalistic tradition and experience is
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' " to the contrary. For better or worse, editing is
what editors are for; and editing is selection and
choice of material." __ U.S. at __, 36 L.Ed.2d at
796.
Similar views were expressed in the concurring opinions of Justices Douglas and Stewart:

Justice Douglas:

"It would come as a surprise to the public as
well as to publishers and editors of newspapers
to be informed that a newly created federal
bureau would hereafter provide 'guidelines' for
newspapers or promulgate rules that would give
a federal agency power to ride herd on the publishing business to make sure that fair comment
on all current issues was made.
*

*

*

"Of course there is private censorship in the
newspaper field. But for one publisher who may
suppress a fact, there are many who will print it.
But if the government is the censor, administrative fiat not freedom of choice carries the day."
__U.S. at __, 36 L.Ed.2d at 811, 812.

Justice Stewart:
"There is never a paucity of arguments in
favor of limiting the freedom of the press. The
Court of Appeals concluded that greater government control of press freedom is acceptable here
because of the scarcity of frequencies for broad-
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casting. But there are many more broadcasting
stations than there are daily newspapers.
*

*

*

"Perhaps I overstate the logic of the opinion of
the Court of Appeals. Perhaps its 'balancing' of
First Amendment 'values' would require no more
than that newspapers be compelled to give 'limited' access to dissident voices, and then only if
those voices were 'responsible'. And perhaps it
would require that such access be compelled only
. when there was a single newspaper in a particular community. But it would be a close question for me which of these various alternative
results would be more grossly violative of the
First Amendment's guarantee of a free press.
For that guarantee gives .every newspaper the
liberty to print what it chooses and reject what
it chooses, free from the intrusive editorial thumb
of Government." __ U.S. at __ , 36 L.Ed.2d
at 807-808.
(Footnotes omitted)
The attempt by the Florida Supreme Court to analogize §104.38, Fla. Stat., with the Fairness Doctrine must,
therefore, necessarily fail. The supposed analogy ignores
completely the express and repeated statements by this
Court that such constitutional merit as the Fairness Doctrine may have rests entirely on the "unique and special
problems" presented by the technology of the electronics
media which are wholly absent in the instant case. The
reliance of the Court below upon Red Lion was thus error.
If its decision permitted to stand, it will obliterate the

'
distinctions which this Court has found to exist between
the media and will accord to newspapers a lesser measure
of journalistic freedom than that accorded to broadcasters.
5. The effect of the Florida statute will be to reduce, not increase, the flow of expression of political
views.

Section 104.38, Fla. Stat., cannot be permitted to stand
because there is no compelling state interest to sustain a
regulation which suspends the unfettered exercise of editorial discretion and requires the publication of material
against the newspaper's will. The impact upon the vital
role of a free press, if this statute is upheld, will be profound.
"A free press stands as one of the greater interpreters between the government and the people.
To allow it to be fettered is to fetter ourselves."
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233,
2·50 (1936).
The Florida Supreme Court ignored numerous First
Amendment cases in which statutes have been struck
down which might have a constitutionally impermissible
chilling effect on freedom of expression. For example, one
of the principal reasons for the doctrine announced in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964),
was to provide more "elbow room" for free expression
on subjects of public interest and concern.
" . . . would-be critics of official conduct may
be deterred from voicing their criticism, even
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though it is believed to be true and even
though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether
it can be proved in court or ~ear of the expense
of having to do so. They tend to make only statements which 'steer far wider of the unlawful
zone.' Speiser v. Randall, supra, 357 U.S. at 526.
The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the
variety of public debate. It is inconsistent with
the First and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at
279.

See also, Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 52-53
(1971) ; Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
As the District of Columbia held in Washington Post
Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert.
d,enied, 385 U.S. 1011 (1967) :
"Unless persons, including newspapers, desiring to exercise their First Amendment rights
are assured freedom from the harassment of lawsuits, they will tend to become self-censors. And
to this extent debate on public issues and the conduct of public officials will become less uninhibited, less robust, and less wide-open, for selfcensorship affecting the whole public is 'hardly
less virulent for being privately administered.' "
The intrusion of §104.38, Fla. Stat., reaches to "any
matter" published in a newspaper, presumably including
not only editorials, which were the basis of Tornillo's complaint in this case, but also news stories, columns, advertising, cartoons, and any other material. The statute, therefore, sweeps far broader than the narrow regulation of

"

classified advertising cautiously upheld by this Court in
Pittsburgh Press Company v. Pittsburgh Commission on
Human Relations, __ U.S. __, 37 L.Ed.2d 669 (1973).
If a newspaper cannot print publications concerning
political candidates unless it is prepared to publish their
"replies" at its expense, the newspaper will be deterred
from making the initial publications. Conscientious newspapers will be reluctant to print anything concerning impending elections if in doing so they become obligated
to provide free space for "replies" that may be antithetical
to the newspapers' views. Such "replies" could be obscene
or libelous. The potential expense of printing the "replies"
could be substantial due to the large number of candidates
and the considerable amount of space that every responsible
newspaper in this state devotes to coverage of elections.
The deterrent effect of the statute is even more severe
because it provides for criminal penalties, even though its
interpretation is subject to considerable uncertainty, as
discussed below.

B. The Vagueness and Ambiguity of the Florida Statute Significantly Increase Its Unconstitutional Effect Upon Legitimate Expression

Even if some form of reply or access statute might
theoretically be compatible with the First Amendment,
§104.38, Fla. Stat., is not such a statute. The statute's
vagueness and ambiguity result in uncertainty as to its
meaning, greatly increasing its inhibitory effect upon
the free expression protected by the First Amendment.
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It is fundamental that restrictions upon free expression, even if otherwise constitutional, may violate the First
Amendment if they are insufficiently precise.

"Vague laws in any area suffer a constitutional infirmity. When First Amendment rights
are involved, we look even more closely lest, under
the guise of regulating conduct that is reachable
by the police power, freedom of speech or of the
press suffer." Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195,
200 (1966). (fn.om.)
The constitutional test of definiteness is particularly
strict in the case of a criminal statute such as §104.38,
Fla. Stat. E.g., NAACP v. Bwtton, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33
(1963); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948).
The principal ambiguities in the statute include the
following:
(i) What is a "newspaper"? Does the term include
any publication, such as magazines, newsletters, pamphlets,
brochures and handbills? Does it include "newspapers"
published in other states but circulated in Florida?

(ii) Does the term "columns" in the statute include
editorials, signed columns, news articles and letters to the
editor? Does the term include advertisements? Cartoons?
Does the term include replies published pursuant to
§104.38, Fla. Stat.?
(iii) What is an "assault" on personal character,
or an "attack" on an official record? Do they merely en-

compass criticism, no matter how truthful or valid? Does
personal character include any individual human quality?
(iv) Need a "candidate" be mentioned specifically
by name to be entitled to a reply, or does a reply right
arise if a "candidate" can be identified in a publication,
even though not named? If a publication refers to a group,
does each member of the group have a right to reply?
(v) What is an equally "conspicuous" place for publication of a reply? Is page four of a newspaper as conspicuous as page five?
(vi) How lengthy a reply may be made? If a newspaper editorial states only, "John Doe is not fit for office,"
what is the length of the permitted reply? Seven words?
Can a statute providing such a "reply" be seriously considered as enhancing public discussion?
Although both lower Florida courts which passed upon
the statute held it void for vagueness, the Florida Supreme
Court sought to circumvent this obstacle in two ways.
First, the Court sought to resolve certain ambiguities in
the statute by interpretation, holding that a newspaper
need not publish a reply unless it was:
"wholly responsive to the charge made in the editorial or other article in a newspaper being replied to and further that such reply will be
neither libelous nor slanderous of the publication
nor anyone else, nor vulgar nor profane." (App.
16)
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Such an interpretive approach which seeks to remedy
massive gaps in the statute cannot cure constitutional infirmities. Criminal statutes affecting freedom of expression must delineate precise standards of conduct without
resort to wholesale judicial construction. Winters v. New
York, supra at 515 (1948); Ashton v. Kentucky, supra;
NAACP v. Button, supra. Moreover, despite the Florida
Supreme Court's efforts, major ambiguities and uncertainties remain. The unconstitutional effect of the statute
cannot be diminished by the Court's intentions, expressed
in its per curiam decision denying the Petition for Rehearing, to refine and define the statute's terms in future
cases. E.g.,Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966).
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CONCLUSION
In upholding the constitutionality of §104.38, Florida
Statutes, the Supreme Court of Florida ignored fundamental First Amendment principles. The questions presented by this appeal are substantial, with major implications for the public interest in freedom of speech and of
the press.
Respectfully submitted,
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Daniel P. S. Paul

The second aspect of the Florida Supreme Court's
curative effort was its holding that because the plaintiff
was seeking only civil remedies, the Court need not pass
upon whether the statute measured up to standards required of criminal statutes. The Court reasoned that even
if the statute was impermissibly vague so that it could
not be the basis of a criminal prosecution, the statute
was sufficient for an implied civil right of action. The
Court thus held, in effect, that an unconstitutionally vague
criminal statute may be invoked for a civil remedy. Such
logic is without precedent.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
"'

CASE NO. 43,009
PAT L. TORNILLO, JR.,
Appellant,
vs.
THE. MIAMI HERALD PUBLISHING COMPANY,
a Division of Knight Newspapers, Inc.,
Appellee.

I
,)

July 18, 1973
PER CURIAM
This cause is before us upon direct appeal from Circuit Court of Dade County, holding Florida Statute 104.381
unconstitutional thereby vesting jurisdiction in this Court
under Article V, Section 3 (b) (1) , Florida Constitution,
as amended 1973.
1F.S. § 104.38- Newspaper assailing candidate in an election;
space for reply - If any newspaper in its columns assails the personal
character of any candidate for nomination or :for election in any election, or charges said candidate with malfeasance or misfeasance in
office, or otherwise attacks his official record, or gives to another free
space for such purpose, such newspaper shall upon request of such
candidate immediately publish free of cost any reply he may make
thereto in as conspicuous a place and in the same kind of type as the
matter that calls for such reply, provided such reply does not take up
more space than the matter replied to. Any person or firm failing to
comply with the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082 or

§775.083.

--~_:j-~

App. 2

App. 3

Appellant Tornillo, plaintiff below, who was a candidate for the State Legislature demanded that appellee print
verbatim his replies to two editorials printed therein attacking appellant's personal character. The appellee refused
and Tornillo filed complaint for declaratory and injunctive
relief and punitive damages. Pursuant to Florida Statute
86.091, the Attorney General of this State was advised that
appellant intended to contest the constitutionality vel non
of Florida Statute 104.38. In view of the circumstances, the
trial court granted the request for an emergency hearing.
Preliminarily, the trial court determined that the
statutory provision in question is a criminal statute and
that absent special circumstances, equity will not ordinarily
enjoin commission of a crime. Pompano Horse Club Co. v.
State, 93 Fla. 415, 111 So. 801 (1927). Notwithstanding
this infirmity in appellant's complaint, the trial court further concluded that F.S. §104.38 is violative of Article I,
Sections 4 and 9 of the Constitution of Florida and the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States as a restraint upon freedom of speech and press and
because ifis impermissibl~_ vague and indefinite.
~-

Believing that the promulgation of this statute is
authorized by Article IV, Section 4,Z and the First3 and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
2Section 4. The United States shall guarantee to every State in
this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each
of them against invasion; and On Application of the Legislature, or ol
the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.
3Amendment I.
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; . . .

'

States, and Article VI, Section 1,4 and Article I, Section 4 5
of the Florida Constitution, and believing that this statute
G enhances rather than abridges freedom of speech and press
protected by the First Amendment, we hold that it does
not constitute a violation of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States or
Article I, Section 4, Florida Constitution.
The election of leaders of our government by a majority of the qualified electors is the fundamental precept
upon which our system of government is based, and is an
integral part of our nation's history. Recognizing that
there is a right to publish without prior governmental
restraint, 6 we also emphasize that there is a correlative
responsibility that the public be fully informed.

--

~-

The entire concept of freedom of expression as seen
by our founding fathers rests upon the necessity .for a fully
informed._electorate.-.J ames Madison wrote that, "A popular government without popular information or the means
of acquiring it is but a prologue to a farce or tragedy; or,
perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance;
4
Section l. Regulation of elections. - All elections by the people
shall he by direct and secret vote. General elections shall he deter·
mined by a plurality of votes cast. Registration and elections shall, and
political party functions may, be regulated by law.

5Section

4. Freedom of speech and press. - Every person may
speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects hut shall he
responsible for the abuse of that right. No law shall he passed to re·
strain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press. In all criminal
prosecutions and civil actions for defamation the truth may he given
in evidence. If the matter charged as defamatory is true and was pub.
lished with good motives, the party shall he acquitted or exonerated.
6 Near

v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, New York Times v. United
States, 430 U.S. 713, Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, La·
monet v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301.
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and a people who mean to be their own governors, must
arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives
(toW. T. Barry, August 4, 1822) ." 7
-The _public "need •tg }cnow" is most criticaLdliT.!Q.g ~
electi.Qn cainpaign. By enactment of the first comprehensive
corrup~ct relating to primary elections iri 1909
our legislature responded to the need for insuring free and
fair elections. Article III, Section 26, and Article VI, Section 9, Constitution of Florida 1885, commanded the Legislature to pass laws "regulating elections and prohibiting
under adequate penalties, all undue influence thereof from
power, bribery, tumult or other improper practices" and
to "enact such laws as will preserve the purity of the
ballot given under this Constitution." This act of 1909 did
not deal with the subject of the wrongful use of newspapers or other printed or written matter, with the exception of a provision which declared it to be a misdemeanor
for any candidate or other person to have or distribute on
day of primary at or near any polling place any writing
against any candidate in the primary. Florida Statute
104.38 was originally enacted in 1913 as Chapter 6470,
Section 12, Laws of Florida, 1913. 8 This second act adopted

- - --· - - 76 Writings of James Madison 398 (Hunt Ed. 1906), The Com·
plete Madison 337 ( 1953).
8

Chapter 6470, Section 12 (Laws of Florida, 1913), provided, "That
if any newspaper in its columns assails the personal character of any
candidate for nomination in a primary election, or charges such candidate with malfeasance or misfeasance in office, or otherwise attacks
his official record, or gives to another free space for such purpose, such
newspaper shall, upon request of such candidate, immediately publish
free of cost any reply he may make thereto, in as conspicuous a place
and in the same kind of type as the matter that calls for such reply;
provided, such reply does not take up more space than the matter
replied to. A person who fails to comply with the provisions of this
Section, shall upon conviction be punished by fine not exceeding five
hundred dollars, or by imprisonment." See subsequent history of stat·

' ,,
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-in 1913 known as the corrupt practices act was enacted to
.supplement the act of 1909. The statutory provision, the
constitutionality vel non which is being questioned in the
instant cause, was enacted not to punish, coerce or censor
the press but rather as a part of a centuries old legislative
task of maintaining conditions conducive to free and fair
elections. The Legislature in 1913 decided that owners of
the printing press had already achieved such political clout
that when they engaged in character assailings, the victim's
electoral chances were unduly and improperly diminished.
To assure fairness in campaigns, the assailed candidate had
to be provided with an equivalent opportunity to respond;
otherwise not only the candidate would be hurt but also
the people would be deprived of both sides of the controversy.9
What some segments of the press seem to lose sight
of is that the First Amendment guarantee is "not for the
ute, Section 5927, Revised General Statutes of Florida, 1920, entitled
newspaper assailing candidate must give free space for reply. This
provision was re-enacted as Section 875.40, Florida Statutes, which
varies only slightly from the present law. Section 875.40, Florida
Statutes was identical to Chapter 6470, Section 12 (Laws of Florida,
1913). In 1951, the Legislature renumbered and slightly revised this
provision to cover any elections (not just primaries) and to provide
that, "Any one failing to comply with the provisions of the section
shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a misdemeanor." Chapter 268.70,
Laws of Florida, 1951. Section 104.38 was entitled, "Newspaper assail·
ing candidate in election; space for reply." See also Chapter 28151,
General Laws, 1953, which adds the words "or for election" so that
the preliminary portion of the statute reads: "If any newspaper in
its columns assails the personal character of any candidate for nom·
ination or for election in any election . . . " In 1972, HB 2801 at·
tempting to repeal F.S. 104.38 died in committee.
9£x Parte Hawthorne, ll6 Fla. 608, 156 So. 619 (1934). 9 Florida
L.J. 297 (1935), "Brief History of the Corrupt Practices Act of Florida,"
J. V. Keen.
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benefit of the press so much as for the benefit of us all. 1110
Speech concerning public affairs is more than self expression. It is the essence of self government. u
Mr. Justice Learned Hand expressed the role of the
press well when he emphasized,
"However neither exclusively, nor even primarily
are the interests of the newspaper industry conclusive; for that industry serves one of the most
vital of all general interests: The dissemination
of news from as many different sources and with
as many different facets and colors as possible." 12
In Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946), the
Supreme Court of the United States emphasized that the
power of the press must be tempered with responsibility
when it explained,
"Without a free press there can be no free society. Freedom of the press, however, is not an
end in itself but a means to the end of a free
society. The scope and nature of the constitutional protection of freedom of speech must be
viewed in that light and in that light applied. . . .
"A free press is vital to a democratic society
because its freedom gives it power. Power in a
democracy implies responsibility in its exercise.

10Time,

Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389.

11 Garrison
12 United

v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74.75 (1964).

States v. Associated Press, 52 F.Supp. 362, 372.
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'
No institution in a democracy, either governmental or private, can have absolute power. Nor
can the limits of power which enforce responsibil~ty be finally determined by the limited power
itself. ... In plain English, freedom carries with
it responsibility even for the press; freedom of
the press is not a freedom from responsibility for
its exercise. Most State constitutions expressly
provide for liability for abuse of the press's freedom. That there was such legal liability was so
taken for granted by the framers of the First
Amendment that it was not spelled out. Responsibility for its abuse was embedded in the law.
The First Amendment safeguarded that right.
"The press does have the right, which is its professional function, to criticize and to advocate.
The whole gamut of public affairs is the domain
for fearless and critical comment, and not the
least the administration of justice. But the public
function which belongs to the press makes it an
obligation of honor to exercise this function only
with the fullest sense of responsibility. Without
such a lively sense of responsibility a free press
may readily become a powerful instrument of
injustice." [Emphasis Supplied]
The concept which appears throughout the decisions
underlying First Amendment guarantees that there is a
broad societal interest in the free flow of information to
the public by the Supreme Court of the United States was
explicitly stated in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964), as well as other Supreme Court decisions, as
follows:

App. 8
"The general prop'Osition that freedom of expression upon public questions is secured by the First
Amendment has long been settled by our decisions.
The constitutional safeguard we have said, 'was
fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people.' Roth vs. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498, 1506,
77 S.Ct. 1304. The maintenance of the opportunity
for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the
people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security
of the republic, is a fundamental principle of the
constitutional system."

I

The statute here under consideration is designed to
f add to the--now--of information and ideas and does nOt
constitute an incurSionu-po;- Fir:~mendment rights or ·
a prior restraint, since no spe~ifi~is
_excluded. There is nothing prohibited but rather it requires,
in the interest of full and fair discussion, additional information.
The right of the public to know all sides of a controversy and from such information to be able to make an
enlightened choice is being jeopardized by the growing concentration of the ownership of the mass media into fewer
and fewer hands, resulting ultimately in a form of private
censorship. Through consolidation, syndication, acquisition
of radio and television stations and the demise of vast
numbers of newspapers, competition is rapidly vanishing
and news corporations are acquiring monopolistic influence
over huge areas of the country. We take note of a recent
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"
" article in Florida Trend magazine, March 1973, explic
ing that the Miami Herald is the largest newspaper p1
lished in Florida, that it is larger in size than the next t
largest newspapers; and that it is not only a large c
daily newspaper but also is a regional and internati01
newspaper.

Freedom of expression was retained by the peo]
through the First Amendment for all the people and ?
merely for .a select few. The First Amendment did 1
create a privileged class which through a monopoly
instruments of the newspaper industry would be able
deny to the people the freedom of expression which 1
First Amendment guarantees. The Supreme Court of 1
United States in Associated Press v. United States, ~
U.S. 1, 20, clearly expounded,
"It would be strange indeed, however, if the grave
concern for freedom of the press which prompted
adoption of the First Amendment should be read
as a command that the government was without
power to protect that freedom. The First Amendment, far from providing an argument against
application of the Sherman Act, here provides
powerful reasons to the contrary. That Amendment rests on the assumption that the widest
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the
welfare of the public, that a free press is a condition of a free society. Surely a command that
the government itself shall not impede the free
flow of ideas does not afford non-governmental
combinations a refuge if they impose restraints
upon that constitutionally guaranteed freedom.

App. 11
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Freedom to publish means freedom for all and not
for some. Freedom to publish is guaranteed by the
Constitution, but freedom to combine to keep
others from publishing is not. Freedom of the
press from governmental interference under the
First Amendment does not sanction repression
of that freedom by private interests. The First
Amendment affords not the slightest support for
the contention that a combination to restrain
trade in news and views has any constitutional
immunity."
More_ recently in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C.,
381 F.2d 908, affirmed 395 U.S. 367 (1969), the Supreme
Court opined,
"Nor can we say that it is inconsistent with the
First Amendment goal of producing an informed
public capable of conducting its own affairs to
require a broadcaster to permit answers to personal attacks occurring in the course of discussing
controversial issues, or to require that the political opponents of those endorsed by the station be
given a chance to communicate with the public.
Otherwise, station owners and a few networks
would have unfettered power to make time available only to the highest bidders, to communicate
only their own views on public issues, people and
candidates, and to permit on the air only those
with whom they agreed. There is no sanctuary in
the First Amendment for unlimited private censorship operating in a medium not open to all.
'Freedom of the press from governmental interference under the First Amendment does not

"" sanction repression of that freedom by private
interests.' Associated Press v. United States, 326

u.s.

1, 20 (1945) ."

By this tendency toward monopolization, the voice of the
press tends to become exclusive in its observation and its
wisdom which in turn deprives the public of their right
to know both sides of controversial matters.
Appellant urges that if a newspaper may attack a
candidate with impunity and he is provided no right to
reply, the public interest in free expression suffers, because they can only hear the publisher's side of the controversy and are denied the dissenting view.
Although we have carefully considered appellee's argument that Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C .. supra, is
inapplicable ~o the present cause, we cannot discount certain excerpts therefrom which ~ applicable.- to First.
~mendment guarantees in general. Therein, the Supreme
Court explained that,
"Congress does not abridge freedom of speech or
press by legislation directly or indirectly multiplying the voices and views presented to the public
through time sharing, fairness doctrines, or other
devices which limit or dissipate the power of those
who sit astride the channels of communication."
395 U.S. at 401, n. 28.- --

-

That Court further stated in Red Lion Broadcasting v.
F.C.C., supra, at 390, in Associated Press v. U.S., supra,
at 20, and N ew York Times v. Sullivan, supra, at 270,
that it is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve

App. 12
an uninhibited marketplace of ideas wherein truth will
prevail rather than to countenance a monopolization of
that market whether by government or private enterprise.

App. 13

'
cussion. Barron, Access to the Press - A New
First Amendment Right, 80 Har. L. Rev. 1641,
1666-1678 (1967). It is important to recognize
that the private individual often desires press exposure either for himself, his ideas, or his causes.
Constitutional adjudication must take into account
the individual's interest in access to the press as
well as the individual's interest in preserving his
reputation, even though libel actions by their nature encourage a narrow view of the individual's
interest since they focus only on situations where
the individual has been harmed by undesired press
attention. A constitutional rule that deters the
press from covering the ideas or activities of the
private individual thus conceives the individual's
interest too narrowly."

Florida's right of reply statute is consistent with the
First Amendment as applied to this State through the
Fourteenth Amendment. In Rosenbloom v. M etromedia. 403
U.S. 29, 47, we find that the Supreme Court of the United
States is inclined to this position by the following quote
from the majority opinion:
"Furthermore, in First Amendment terms, the
cure seems far worse than the disease. If the
States fear that private citizens will not be able
to respond adequately to publicity involving them,
the solution lies in the direction of ensuring their
ability to respond, rather than in stifling public
discussion of matters of public concern."
To this comment, the Court appended the following note:
"Some States have adopted retraction statutes or
right-of-reply statutes. See Donnelly, The Right
of Reply: An Alternative to an Action for Libel,
34 Va. L.Rev. 867 (1948); Note, Vindication of
the Reputation of a Public Official, 80 Harv.
L.Rev. 1730 (1967 ) . Cf. R ed Lion Broadcasting
Co. v . FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
"One writer, in arguing that the First Amendment itself should be read to guarantee a right
of access to the media not limited to a right to
respond to defamatory falsehoods, has suggested
several ways the law might encourage public dis-

Although appellee attempts to minimize the import of the
aforestated quotation, we feel compelled to note that such
remarks regarding right to reply legislation are entirely
consistent with past precedent establishing the fundamental purpose of the First Amendment to inform the people.
Neither appellant nor appellee takes issue with the
holding of the trial court that it lacked jurisdiction to
enjoin an alleged violation of Florida Statute 104.38. This
provision is criminal in nature and absent special circumstances equity will usually not enjoin commission of a
crime. 13
Appellant urges that the Right of Reply Statute in
question is neither impermissibly vague nor unnecessarily
13Pompano Horse Club Co. v. State, sup ra, 17 Fla. Jur. Injunctions,

§46.
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broad. We must agree and therefore uphold the constitutionality of this statutory provision. It is a fundamental
principle that this Court has the duty, if reasonably possible, consistent with protection of constitutional rights, to
resolve all doubts as to the validity of a statute in favor
of its constitutionality and if reasonably possible a statute
should be construed so as not to conflict with the constitution.14 Courts are inclined to adopt that reasonable interpretation of a statute which removes it farthest from constitutional infirmity. In Gitlow v. People of New York,
268 U.S. 652, the Supreme Court of the United States
stated every presumption is to be indulged in favor of the
validity of a statute, and the case is to be considered in the
light of the principle that the State is primarily the judge
of regulations in the interest of public safety and welfare.
We do not believe that Florida's statutory right of
reply is lacking in any of the required standards of preciseness. The statute is sufficiently explicit to inform those
who are subject to it as to what conduct on their part
will render them liable to its penalties.
We recognize that certainty is all the more essential
when vagueness might induce individuals to forego their
rights of speech, press and association for fear of violating
an unclear law. Scull v. Virginia, 359 U.S. 344 (1959),
Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 19·5 (1965).
14Buck v. Gibbs, 34 F. Supp. 510, Mod. 313 U.S. 387 (1940);
Hunter v. Owens, 80 Fla. 812, 86 So. 839 (1920); Cragin v. Ocean 4
Lake Realty Co., 133 So. 569, 135 So. 795 (1931), appeal dism. 286
U.S. 523; Haworth v. Chapman, 113 Fla. 591, 152 So. 663 (1933);
Hanson v. State, 56 So.2d 129 (1952) ; Overstreet v. Blum, 227 So.2d
197 (Fla. 1969) ; Hancock v. Sapp, 225 So.2d 411 (Fla. 1969 ) ; Rich v.
Ryals, 212 So.2d 641 (Fla. 1968).

' In Brock v. Hardie, 154 So. 690, 694 (1934), relative
to the issue of vagueness, this Court said,

"Whether the words of the Florida statute are
sufficiently explicit to inform those who are
subject to its provisions what conduct on their
part will render them liable to its penalties is
the test by which the statute must stand or fall,
because, as was stated in the opinion above mentioned, 'a statute which either forbids or requires
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application violates
the first essential of due process of law.'
"Such seems to be the test approved by the Supreme Court of the United States. Citation of
authorities as to what may be considered the
exact meaning of the phrase 'so vague that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning,' so that certain conduct may be considered within or outside the true meaning of
that phrase, or what language of a statute may
lie within or without it, would be of little aid
to us.
"We must apply our own knowledge with which
observation and experience have supplied us in
determining whether words employed by the
statute are reasonably clear or nor (sic) in indicating the legislative purpose, so that a person
who may be liable to the penalties of the act may
know that he is within its provisions or not."
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'

Inter alia, appellee attacks the constitutionality of
the statute on grounds of vagueness and overbreadth because of the use of the term "any"-referring to the type
of reply allowable. This statute provides in part,

''
Although apparently not raised before the trial court,
tl)e brief of Amicus Times Publishing Co. has raised the
issue that Florida Statute 104.38 is a deprivation of property right without due process. With this contention, we
can not agree. Florida Statute 104.38 is a valid exercise
of the state police power enacted to assure the integrity
of the electoral process. In Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272
(1928), the Supreme Court stated,

"if any newspaper in its columns assails the personal character of any candidate for nomination
or for election in any election, or charges said
candidate with malfeasance or misfeasance in office, or otherwise attacks his official record, or
gives to another free space for such purpose, such
newspaper shall upon request of such candidate
immediately publish free of cost any reply he may
make thereto in as conspicuous a place and in the
same kind of type as the matter that calls for
such reply ...." [Emphasis Supplied]
Because of the longstanding policy of this Court to give
a statute, if reasonably possible, a construction supporting
its constitutionality, we hold that the mandate of the
statute refers to "any reply" which is wholly responsive
to the charge made in the editorial or other article in a
newspaper being replied to and further that such reply
will be neither libelous nor slanderous of the publication
nor anyone else, nor vulgar nor profane.
We conclude that the statute in question is as certain
and definite as others heretofore upheld as constitutionally
permissible. The following statement made by Judge Tamm
in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F. C. C., supra, 381 F.2d
at 921, is clearly applicable to the instant cause: "Here
there is no broad-reaching, all-embracive statutory provision penalizing knowing as well as unknowing conduct."

"And where the public interest is involved preferment of that interest over the property interest of the individual, to extent even of its destruction, is one of the distinguishing characteristics
of every exercise of police power which affects
property." Id. at 279, 280.

.,

We find this argument of deprivation of property rights
by being required to furnish free space to be without
merit. See Miller v. Schoene, supra; Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501, at 506; Red Lion Broadcasting v. F. C. C.,
supra; Rosenbloom v. M etromedia, supra; Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Attorney General, 94 N.H. 148, 48 A.2d 478
(1946); Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley
Plaz·a, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
In conclusion, we do not find that the operation of
the statute would interfere with freedom of the press as
guaranteed by the Florida Constitution and the Constitution of the United States. Indeed it strengthens the concept in that it presents both views leaving the reader the
freedom to reach his own conclusion. This decision will
encourage rather than impede the wide open and robust
dissemination of ideas and counterthought which the concept of free press both fosters and protects and which is
essential to intelligent self government.
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Newspapers are not wholly dependent on electronic
nedia as were the broadcasters in Red Lion Broadcasting
7o. v. F. C. C., supra. However, we have no difficulty in
;aking judicial notice that the publishers of newspapers
ln this contemporary era would perish without this vital
3ource of communications. The dissemination of news other
than purely local is transmitted over telegraph wires or
over air waves. This not only includes dissemination of
news but also in chain newspaper operations so prevalent
today, the Miami Herald being one; even editorials are
prepared in one place and transmitted electronically to
another. Therefore, the principles of law enunciated in
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F. C. C., supra, have been
taken into consideration in reaching our opinion.
A half free press would be deceptive to the public.
Florida Statute 104.38, in the interest of all the people,
provides that candidates for public office under certain
prescribed circumstances shall have a right of reply, a
right of expression. It does not deny to the owner of the
instruments of the newspaper industry any right of expression. The statute assures, and does not abridge, the
right of expression which the First Amendment guarantees. The statute supports the freedom of the press in its
true meaning-that is, the right of the reader to the whole
story, rather than half of it--and without which the
reader would be "blacked out" as to the other side of the
controversy.
For the foregoing reasons, we find Florida Statute
104.38 to be constitutional and reverse the holding of the
trial court that it is unconstitutional.

'

Accord~~gly, the judgment of the trial court is re-

versed and this cause is remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.
It is so ordered.
CARLTON, C.J., ADKINS, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ.,
and RAWLS, District Court Judge, Concur
ROBERTS, J., Concurs Specially with Opinion
BOyD, J~1 Dis~ents with Q.Qiillim
ROBERTS, J., Specially Concurring:
I concur in the opinion and judgment of the majority.
We are fully cognizant of the recent decision rendered by
the Supreme Court of the United States in Columbia

Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, --U.S.--, 41 U.S.L.W. 4688, decided May 29,
1973, which holds that neither the Federal Communications Act nor the First Amendment require broadcasters
to accept paid editorial advertisements. But this opinion
in no way derogated the earlier opinion of that court in
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 (1969),
validating the fairness doctrine of the Federal Communications Commission which imposes two affirmative responsibilities on the broadcaster-coverage of issues must
be adequate and must fairly reflect differing viewpoints.
As the Supreme Court stated in Columbia Broadcasting,
supra, "In fulfilling its Fairness Doctrine obligations, the
broadcaster must provide free time for the presentation
of opposing views if a paid sponsor is unavailable, . . .
and must initiate programming on public issues if no one
else seeks to do so. 'See John J. Dempsey, 6 P & F Radio
Reg. 615 (1950); Red Lion, supra, 395 U.S., at 378."
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The complaints filed in Columbia Broadcasting, supra,
by the Democratic National Committee and the Business
Executives Move for Vietnam Peace, alleged that a broadcaster had violated the First Amendment by refusing to
sell it time to broadcast spot announcements expressing
political views of the different groups. The Supreme Court
turned its decision primarily on the limited nature of the
broadcasting airwaves and the existence of the Fairness
Doctrine which requires broadcasters to provide free time
for presentation of opposing political views when a paid
sponsor is not available. The decision in Columbia Broadcasting is directed solely to the peculiar and limited nature
of broadcasting frequencies, and that decision is not applicable to the instant facts presently before this Court in
the case sub judice. Chief Justice Burger commences the
body of his opinion with the following remarks:
"Mr. Justice White's opinion for the Court in
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S.
367 (1969), makes clear that the broadcast media
pose unique and special problems not present in
the traditional free speech case. Unlike other
media, broadcasting is subject to an inherent
physical limitation. Broadcast frequencies are a
scarce resource; they must be portioned out
among applicants. All who possess the financial
resources and the desire to communicate by television or radio cannot be satisfactorily accommodated. The Court spoke to this reality when,
in Red Lion, we said 'it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast
comparable to the right of every individual to
speak, write, or publish.' Red Lion, supra, 395
U.S., at 388.

'
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"Because the broadcast media utilize a valuable
and limited public resource, there is also present
an unusual order of First Amendment values.
Red Lion discussed at length the application of
the First Amendment to the broadcast media.
In analyzing the broadcasters' claim that the
Fairness Doctrine and two of its component rules
violated their freedom of expression, we held that
'[n] o one has a First Amendment right to a
license or to monopolize a radio frequency; to
deny a station license because 'the public interest' requires it 'is not a denial of free speech."
Red Lion, supra, 395 U.S., at 389. Although the
broadcaster is not without protection under the
First Amendment, United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948), '[i]t
is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the
right of the broadcasters, which is paramount....
It is the right of the public to receive suitable
access to social, political, esthetic, moral and
other ideas and experiences which is crucial here.
That right may not constitutionally be abridged
either by Congress or by the FCC.' Red Lion,
supra, 395 U.S., at 390."

After recounting the history of broadcast regulations, the
court in Columbia Broadcasting, supra, opined that broadcasters are charged with the duty of providing the listening and viewing public with access to a balanced presentation of information on issues of public importance. The
Supreme Court was particularly concerned with forcing
broadcasters to accept paid political advertisements when
broadcasting frequencies are so limited because of a substantial risk that such a system would be monopolized by
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'
those who could and would pay the costs, and that a system
so heavily weighted in favor of the financially affluent or
those with access to wealth would in effect undermine the
effective operation of the Fairness Doctrine. The views of
the affluent would prevail since they would have it within
their power to purchase time more frequently, and editorial advertising could then be monopolized by those of
one political persuasion. Those were the concerns of the
Supreme Court in Columbia Broadcasting, supra, when it
rendered its decision that broadcasters are not required to
accept paid editorial advertisements regardless of the content thereof.
Our opinion in the instant cause in no way conflicts
with the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Columbia
Broadcasting, supra.
CARLTON, C.J., ADKINS, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ.,
and RAWLS, District Court Judge, Concur
BOYD, J., Dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
This statute carries a penalty provision for violations
thereof, and it therefore must be most strictly construed
in favor of any person accused thereunder. The statute is
so vague on its face as to raise doubts in the minds of
those reading it as to the exact underlying legislative
intent.
There are no standards as to when a publisher must
carry a reply. For example, the following are just some of
the important questions left unanswered by this statute.

Does the law include both news stories and editorial c
ment? If a story mentions a "situation", but does
mention the candidate by name, may he reply? When
publisher knows his statements are true, must he pub
a statement from the candidate which he knows to
false? If the reply of the candidate libels other per s1
must the publisher print it, and, if so, is the publi~
subject to liability for any resulting libel suit? If
candidate's reply were to contain obscene language, wo
the publisher still have to print it-and thereby im
prosecution under our obscenity laws?

The First Amendment to the Constitution of
United States provides that, "Congress shall make
law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of ·
press...." Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution of 1
State of Florida similarly provides: "No law shall
passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or
the press." Since these constitutional provisions prohi'
the government from limiting the right of the publishi
press to publish news and comment editorially, it wot
be equally unconstitutional for the government to com1
a publisher to print a statement of any other person,
persons, against that publisher's will.

The majority opinion correctly observes that freedo
of speech and freedom of the press carry the duty to spe:
the truth. And, of course, the constitutional rights of fre
dam of speech and freedom of the press must be exercisE
with appropriate regard to the provisions of our libel ar
obscenity statutes. As in all other areas of public ar
private service, some errors will, from time to time, sure
occur. Yet, recognizing that the survival of a free pre
is contingent upon the press fulfilling its duty to the ge

App. 24

App. 25
'1.

eral public, the overwhelming majority of those in the
publishing press comply with the highest of ethical
standards.

,.

APPENDIX B

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

We are taught in the Bible that, "the truth will make
you free". 1

CASE NO. 43,009

Free people can make proper decisions for their own
self-government only when they are adequately informed
by a free press. To the extent that government limits or
adds to that which a publisher must distribute, freedom
of speech and freedom of the press are thereby diminished.
Almost everyone whose name has been carried frequently in the news media has been offended, at one time
or another, by stories or comments with which he disagrees. This is part of the price one pays for success and
notoriety. If there exists a problem in this state of affairs,
the muzzling of a free press is not the solution to such
problem.
I therefore dissent.

lJohn 8:32

PAT L. TORNILLO, JR.,

App1
vs.

THE MIAMI HERALD PUBLISHING COMPA~
a Division of Knight Newspapers, Inc.,

ApJ

October 10, 1973

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
PER CURIAM
Appellee, Miami Herald, by petition for rehe:
strenuously argues that this Court's opinion overlook
fact that §104.38, Florida Statutes, is a criminal st
and that this Court is without power to rewrite or per
plastic surgery on a criminal statute in an attempt to
the statute's vagueness by writing a definition of "re
Appellee then journeys upon numerous hypothetical iJ
ries-What is a newspaper? What is an assault? Wh
an equally "conspicuous place" ?-and then reasons
these "obvious ambiguities" render the subject statw
vague that same must be held unconstitutional.
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As was emphaticaJly stated in the opinion of this
Court, the action underlying this cause before us is a civil
action which was filed in the Circuit Court for the Eleventh
Judicial Circuit seeking to require appellee to publish
appellant's reply pursuant to Florida Statute 104.38 and
for damages. No criminal penalty is sought in the case sub
judice, and, therefore, the validity vel non of the criminal
penalty is not here involved. We are not unmindful of the
line of decisions from this Court and the Supreme Court of
the United States requiring more specificity in statutory
authorship to support a statute which imposes a criminal
penalty. However, the language of our opinion clearly defi~es what would constitute a wrongdoing. We take this
opportunity to restate the following excerpt from our
opinion:
"It is a fundamental principle that this Court
has the duty, if reasonably possible, consistent
with protection of constitutional rights, to resolve all doubts as to the validity of a statute in
favor of its constitutionality and if reasonably
possible a statute should be construed so as not
to conflict with the constitution. 1 Courts are inclined to adopt that reasonable interpretation of
a statute which removes it farthest from constitutional infirmity. In Gitlow v. People of New
York, 268 U.S. 652, the Supreme Court of the
United States stated every presumption is to be
- - --- - 1Buck v. Gibbs, 34 F.Supp. 510, Mod. 313 U.S. 387 (1940) ;
Hunter v. Owens, 80 Fla. 812, 86 So. 839 (1920); Cragin v. Ocean &
Lake Realty Co., 133 So. 569, 135 So. 795 ( 1931 ) , appeal dism. 286
U.S. 523; Haworth v. Chapmen, 113 Fla. 591, 152 So. 663 (1933);
Hanson v. State, 56 So.2d 129 (1952) ; Overstreet v. Blum, 227 So.2d
197 (Fla. 1969) ; Hancock v. Sapp, 225 So.2d 411 (Fla. 1969 ) ; Rich
v. Ryals, 212 So.2d 641 (Fla. 1968) .
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indulged in favor of the validity of a statute, and
the case is to be considered in the light of the
principle that the State is primarily the judge of
regulations in the interest of public safety and
welfare."

Even had this Court found the statute, the constitutionality vel non which is being questioned sub judice, not
to be sufficiently definite and specific to support a criminal penalty, this criminal penalty provision would not be
fatal to the statute because the statute is so constructed
that the criminal penalty can be easily severed and deleted
and still leave a complete legislative expression establishing a civil right to damages. This Court has long held that
where certain clauses, provisions, or sections of a statutory
enactment are in violation of constitutional mandates, it
does not necessarily follow that the whole enactment should
fail, and this Court has held that the Court may sever the
unconstitutional provision and uphold the remainder if
that which is left is complete in itself, sensible, and capable
of being executed, whether or not the enactment contains
a severability clause. State ex rel. Boyd v. Deal, 24 Fla.
293, 4 So. 899 (1888), Gwynn v. Hardee, 92, Fla. 543, 110
So. 343 (1926); Lo-uis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 149 So. 8
(Fla. 1933); City of Daytona Beach v. Harvey, 48 So.2d
924 (Fla. 1950); Youngblood v. Darby, 58 So.2d 315 (Fla.
1952) ; Harris v. Bryan, 89 So.2d 601 (Fla. 1956); Cramp
v. The Board of Public Instruction of Orange County, 137
So.2d 828 (Fla. 1962); Davis v. State, 146 So.2d 892 (Fla.
1962) ; Musleh v. Marion County, 200 So.2d 168 (Fla.
1967) ; Small v. Sun Oil Company, 222 So.2d 196 (Fla.
1969). In State v. Newell, 85 So.2d 124 (Fla. 1956), this
Court opined:

.fi _l.l _l.l.

.(,O

.n.pp.... "

"We have held that it is not always necessary to
declare an entire Act invalid where a portion
thereof is unconstitutional simply because the Act
does not contain a severability clause. State v.
Calhoun County, 126 Fla. 376, 170 So. 883, 886,
and cases therein cited. The test is whether this
court can say that the Legislature would not have
enacted the law under scrutiny except for the
provision which is herein held unconstitutional
and invalid."
A comparable statute to Florida Statute 104.38 requiring a full and fair correction, apology, and retraction to
be published in the same editions or corresponding issues
of the periodical in which said article appeared, and in as
conspicuous place and type as was said original article/
as an abatement of the publisher's liability for punitive
damages, was held constitutional by this Court in Ross v.
Gore, 48 So.2d 412 (Fla. 1950). Courts have generally
regarded this type of statute to be in aid of a free press.
We take judicial notice that this statute has been frequently used to avoid punitive damages apparently with
no adverse effect to newspaper publishers. But, indeed,
this statute has been utilized to their financial advantage.
Zflorida Statute 770.02 provides:
"If it appears upon the trial that said article was published
in good faith, that its falsity was due to an honest mistake
of the facts, and that there were reasonable grounds for believing that the statements in said article were true, and that
within ten days after the service of said notice a full and
fair correction, apology and retraction was published in the
same editions or corresponding issues of the newspaper or
periodical in which said article appeared, and in as conspicuous place and type as was said original article, then the
plaintiff in such case shall recover only actual damages."

We also here note another retraction statute promulgated. by the Florida Legislature which defines a procedure
for ~batement of criminal penalty. Florida Statute 836.08
provides:
"Correction, apology, or retraction by newspaper.
- I f it appears upon the trial that said article
was published in good faith, that its falsity was
due to an honest mistake of the facts, and that
there were reasonable grounds for believing that
the statements in said article were true, and that
within ten days after the service of said notice a
full and fair correction, apology and retraction
was published in the same editions or corresponding issues of the newspaper or periodical in which
said article appeared, and in as conspicuous place
and type as was said original article, then any
criminal proceeding charging libel based on an
article so retracted, shall be discontinued and
barred."
Reverting to the hypothetical inquiries posed by appellee, it is observed that similar questions might well be
posed as to the vagueness of certain provisions of Florida
Statute 770.02, viz: "good faith"; "falsity"; "a full and
fair correction"; "apology"; "conspicuous place"; and
Florida Statute 836.08, viz: "correction"; "apology"; "reasonable grounds"; or "a full and fair correction". In short,
the definition and meaning of specific words or phrases
in a particular factual situation have been and will be an
infinite subject of inquiry so long as Homo sapiens engage
in the art of communication. At this stage of the instant
controversy, we are confronted not with the wisdom of the
Legislature in enacting the challenged statutory provision;

...
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our task is to preserve the prerogative of the legislative
body unless it clearly contravenes the basic federal and
state charters adopted by our citizenry.

APPENDIX C

In conclusion, it must be remembered that First
Amendment Freedom of the Press is for the benefit of all
the people and not just those who have invested money in
the publishing business.
The petition for rehearing is denied.
CARLTON, C.J., ROBERTS, ADKINS, McCAIN and
DEKLE, JJ., and RAWLS, District Court Judge, Concur
BOYD, J., Dissents

TORNILLO v. MIAMI HERALD PUBLISHING CO.
No. 72-20199.
Circuit Court, Dade County.
October 20, 1972.
38 Fla. Supp 80
FRANCIS J. CHRISTIE, Circuit Judge.

Final judgment: Plaintiff, a candidate for the state
legislature, demanded that the Miami Herald print verbatim his replies to two editorials in the Herald relating
to his candidacy for public office. The Herald refused.
Plaintiff then brought this action for a mandatory
injunction and for damages seeking to enforce §104.38,
Florida Statutes, by a civil action. The editorials and plaintiff's replies are attached to the complaint. In view of the
nature of the relief requested the court granted plaintiff's
request for an emergency hearing on October 2, 1972.
Pursuant to §86.091, Florida Statutes, the attorney
general was advised that the defendant intended to ask the
court for a declaration that §104.38 was unconstitutional.
The attorney general was served with a copy of the complaint and was represented at the hearing.
§104.38 is a criminal statute. Absent special circumstances equity will not enjoin the commission of a crime.
Pompano Horse Club Co. v. State (1927), 93 Fla. 415, 111
So. 801, 52 A.L.R. 51; 17 Florida Jurisprudence, Injunctions, §46.
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However, there is a more serious infirmity in plaintiff's case. The court is of the opinion that §104.38 violates
Article I, § §4 and 9 of the Florida Constitution and the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution.

Amendment prohibits the government from restraining
the publication even of top secret documents alleged to be
"
vital
to the national security. New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).

This question was considered in State v. News-Journal
Corporation, 36 Fla. Supp. 164, a case filed in the county
judge's court of Volusia County, Florida. In a carefully
reasoned opinion dated February 14, 1972, Judge J. Robert
Durden held §104.38 unconstitutional on two grounds-an
infringement upon freedom of the press, and a denial of
due process of law because the statute is too vague, indefinite and uncertain to constitute notice of what language
may fall within its purview and what constitutes a reply
which must be printed. The attorney general advised the
court that he had elected not to appeal Judge Durden's
decision on the ground that he also had the same reservations about the constitutionality of the statute.

Clearly if the state may not prohibit what a newspaper
may print it cannot assume the editorial function and
direct a newspaper what to print. By the First Amendment, "The Government's power to censor the press was
abolished so that the press would remain forever free to
censure the Government. The press was protected so that
it could bare the secrets of government and inform the
people. Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively
expose deception in government." New York Times Co. v.
United States, supra at page 717 (Justice Black concurring) (1971).

This court concurs in Judge Durden's opinion. State
statutes prohibiting or directing any type of publication,
particularly upon pain of criminal sanction, are presumed
unconstitutional unless it can be demonstrated that the
infringement can be justified as required to protect a substantial public interest threatened by a clear and present
danger. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Thomas
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937). The "priority" given First
Amendment freedoms "gives these liberties a sanctity and
a sanction not permitting dubious intrusions." Thomas v.
Collins, supra at page 530. "Because First Amendment
freedoms need breathing space to survive, government
may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity."
N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). The First

Since §104.38, Florida Statutes, so clearly reaches cases
in which its restraint upon freedom of speech and press
does not measure up to any permissible First Amendment
standard the statute is void on its face.
Because of its broad intrusion into the area protected
by the First Amendment, §104.38 also suffers from an
additional infirmity-it is impermissibly vague and indefinite and this vagueness serves to restrict and stifle protected expression. No editor could know from the statute
exactly what words would offend the statute or the scope
of the reply intended to be mandated. A state may not enact
such a broad statute and leave it to the courts, on a case
by case basis, to determine the constitutionality of its application to various circumstances. To do so places a citizen
in an untenable position of foregoing his protected liber-
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ties, or risking criminal prosecution. This dilemma itself
impermissibly restricts· free expression. Smith v. Cahoon,
283 u.s. 564 (1931).
"Vague laws in any area suffer a constitutional infirmity. When First Amendment rights
are involved, we look even more closely lest, under
the guise of regulating conduct that is reachable
by the police power, freedom of speech or of the
press suffer." Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195,
200 (1966).
The strict standards of overbreadth and vagueness in
First Amendment cases are even stricter where a statute
provides criminal sanctions. "The standard for certainty
in statutes punishing for offenses is higher than in those
depending primarily upon civil sanctions for enforcement."
Winters v. New York, supra at page ·515.
The attorney general advised the court at the bearing
(sic) that his opinion as to the unconstitutionality of this
statute had not changed since State v. News-Journal Corporation, supra, and therefore he did not elect to intervene
to defend the statute.

'

APPENDIX D
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 43,009
PAT L. TORNILLO, JR.,
Appellant
vs.
THE MIAMI HERALD PUBLISHING COMPANY,
a Division of Knight Newspapers, Inc.,
Appellee.
NOTICE OF APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES
Notice is hereby given that The Miami Herald Publishing Company, a division of Knight Newspapers, Inc.,
Appellee in this case, hereby appeals to the Supreme Court
of the United States from the final judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of Florida upholding the constitutionality of Section 104.38, Florida Statutes, which was
entered in this action on July 18, 1973 and adhered to upon
Petition for Rehearing on October 10, 1973.
This Appeal is taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1257 (2).

Plaintiff stated that if the court found the statute on
which this suit is based unconstitutional he did not desire
to take further proceedings in this court and requested that
his suit be dismissed with prejudice.

PAUL & THOMPSON

Is/ Dan Paul
Dan Paul

Accordingly, confirming the court's oral ruling made
at the conclusion of the hearing, this cause is dismissed
with prejudice at plaintiff's cost.

/ s/ James W. Beasley, Jr.
James W. Beasley, Jr.
Counsel for Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing Notice
of Appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States were
served by mail upon the following this 30th day of October,1973:
Mr. Tobias Simon
Attorney for Appellant
1492 South Miami Avenue
Miami, Florida 33130
The Honorable Robert L. Shevin
Attorney General, State of Florida
The Capitol
Tallahassee, Florida
Mr. Jonathan L. Alpert
Attorney for Amicus Curiae American Civil
Liberties Union of Florida, Inc.
19 West Flagler Street
Miami, Florida 33130
Mr. William C. Ballard
Baynard, McLeod, Lang, Eckert and Ballard
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Times Publishing
Company
669 First Avenue, North
St. Petersburg, Florida 33701
Mr. Donald U. Sessions
Amicus Curiae
P. 0. Box 666
Daytona Beach, Florida 32015

',,
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Mr. Harold B. Wah1
Loftin and Wahl
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Florida Publishing
Company
Suite 414, Florida Title Building
Jacksonville, Florida 32202
Mr. Thomas T. Cobb
Cobb, Cole, Sigerson, McCoy, Bell & Bond
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae News-Journal
Corporation
444 North Beach Street
Daytona Beach, Florida 32015
Mr. S. Lindsey Holland, Jr.
Crofton, Holland & Starling
Attorneys for Amici Curiae Gannett Florida
Corporation, News-Press Publishing Company,
and Pensacola News-Journal, Inc.
P. 0. Box459
Melbourne, Florida 32901
Mr. Charles W. Pittman
MacFarlane, Ferguson, Allison & Kelly
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae The Tribune
Company
P. 0. Box 1531
Tampa, Florida 33601
Mr. Cecil H. Albury
Heuer, Albury & Okell
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Palm Beach
Newspapers, Inc.
P. 0. Box 590
West Palm Beach, Florida
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Mr. James L. Livingston
Livingston & Livingston
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Sebring News, Inc.
P. 0. Box 1068
Mr. Arthur Jacobs
Jacobs & Sinoff
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Fernandina Beach
News-Leader
P. 0. Drawer 1
Fernandina Beach, Florida 32034
Mr. Willard Ayres
Ayres, Swigers, Cluster, Tucker & Curry
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Ocala Star-Banner
P. 0. Box 1148
Ocala, Florida 32670
Mr. John F. Wen del
Wendel and McArthur, P. A.
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae The Ledger
4404 South Florida Avenue
Lakeland, Florida 33803
Mr. Selig I. Goldin
Goldin & Turner
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Gainesville Sun
P. 0. Box 1251
Gainesville, Florida 32602
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Mr. P. B. Howell, Jr.
Cherry, Howell & Cummins
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae The Daily
Commercial
P. 0. Box 208
Leesburg, Florida 32748
Mr. A. W. Nichols, III
Attorney for Amicus Curiae The Palatka
Daily News
P. 0. Box26
Palatka, Florida 32077
Mr. Klein Wigginton
McClure and Wigginton, P. A.
Attorneys for Amici Curiae The Islander, The
Sun-Journal, The Polk County Democrat, Citrus
County Chronicle, and Montlake Media, Inc.
P. 0. Box 1716
Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Mr. Terry David
Attorney for Amicus Curiae The Lake City
Reporter
P. 0. Box 1328
Lake City, Florida 32055
Mr. Malcolm B. Johnson
Amicus Curiae the Tallahassee Democrat
P. 0. Box 990
Tallahassee, Florida 32302
/ s/ James W. Beasley, Jr.
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APPENDIX E
FLORIDA STATUTES

97.021
"

Definitions

The following words and phrases when used in this
code shall be construed:
(1) "Primary election" means election held preceding the general election, for the purpose of nominating a
party nominee to be voted for in the general election to
fill a national, state or county office. The first primary
is a nomination or elimination election, the second primary
is a nominating election only.
( 2) "Special primary election" is a special called
nomination election designated by the governor, for the
purpose of nominating a party nominee to be voted on in
a general or special general election.
(3) "General election" means an election held on the
first Tuesday after the first Monday in November in the
even numbered years, for the purpose of filling national,
state and county offices and for voting on constitutional
amendments as proposed by the legislature.
(4) "Special general election" is a special called election for the purpose of voting on a party nominee to fill a
vacancy in the national, state or county office.

* * * *
(18) "Candidate" shall mean any person who has
filed his qualification papers, and paid his qualifying fees
as required by law.

•

"
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770.02

Correction, apology, or retraction by newspaper

If it appears upon the trial that said article was
published in good faith, that its falsity was due to an
honest mistake of the facts, and that there were reasonable
grounds for believing that the statements in said article
were true, and that within ten days after the service of
said notice a full and fair correction, apology and retraction was published in the same editions or corresponding
issues of the newspaper or periodical in which said article
appeared, and in as conspicuous place and type as was said
original article, then the plaintiff in such case shall recover
only actual damages.
775.082

Penalties for felonies and misdemeanors

* * * *
(5) A person who has been convicted of a designated
misdemeanor may be sentenced as follows:

(a) For a misdemeanor of the first degree, by a
definite term of imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding 1 year;
(b) For a misdemeanor of the second degree, by a
definite term of imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding 60 days.
(6) Nothing in this section shall be construed to
alter the operation of any statute of this state authorizing
a trial court, in its discretion, to impose a sentence of
imprisonment for an indeterminate period within minimum
and maximum limits as provided by law.

775.083

Fine in lieu of or in addition to other criminal
penalty

A person who has been convicted of a crime, oth
than a capital felony, may be sentenced, when specifical
designated by statute, to pay a fine in lieu of or in adc
tion to any punishment described in § 775.082. Fines f ,
designated crimes shall not exceed:
(1) $10,000, when the conviction is of a felony
the first or second degree ;

(2) $5,000, when the conviction is of a felony of tl
third degree;

(3) $1,000, when the conviction is of a misdemean1
of the first degree;

(4) $500, when the conviction is of a misdemean1
of the second degree;

( 5) Any higher amount equal to double the pecuniaJ
gain derived from the offense by the offender or daub
the pecuniary loss suffered by the victim.
(6)
statute.

Any higher amount specifically authorized 1
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APPENDIX F
THE MIAMI HERALD
September 20, 1972
"

The State's Laws And Pat Tornillo
LOOK who's upholding the law!
Pat Tornillo, boss of the Classroom Teachers Association and candidate for the State Legislature in the Oct. 3
runoff election, has denounced his opponent as lacking "the
knowledge to be a legislator, as evidenced by his failure
to file a list of contributions to and expenditures of his
campaign as required by law."
Czar Tornillo calls "violation of this law inexcusable."
This is the same Pat Tornillo who led the CTA strike
from February 19 to March 11, 1968, against the school
children and taxpayers of Dade County. Call it whatever
you will, it was an illegal act against the public interest
and clearly prohibited by the statutes.
We cannot say it would be illegal but certainly it
would be inexcusable of the voters if they sent Pat Tornillo
to Tallahassee to occupy the seat for District 103 in the
House of Representatives.
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APPENDIX G

THE MIAMI HERALD
September 29, 1972

,

,

FROM the people who brought you this-the teacher
strike of '68-come now instructions on how to vote for
responsible government, i.e., against Crutcher Harrison
and Ethel Beckham, for Pat Tornillo. The tracts and
blurbs and bumper stickers pile up daily in teachers'
school mailboxes amidst continuing pouts that the School
Board should be delivering all this at your expense. The
screeds say the strike is not an issue. We say maybe it
wouldn't be were it not a part of a continuation of disregard of any and all laws the CTA might find aggravating.
Whether in defiance of zoning laws at CTA Towers, contracts and laws during the strike, or more recently state
prohibitions against soliciting campaign funds amongst
teachers, CTA says fie and try and sue us-what's good
for CTA is good for CTA and that is natural law. Tornillo's law, maybe. For years now he has been kicking the
public shin to call attention to his shakedown statesmanship. He and whichever acerbic prexy is in alleged office
have always felt their private ventures so chock-full of
public weal that we should leap at the chance to nab the
tab, be it half the Glorious Leader's salary or the dues
checkoff or anything else except perhaps mileage on the
staff hydrofoil. Give him public office, says Pat, and he
will no doubt live by the Golden Rule. Our translation
reads that as more gold and more rule.
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Pat L. Tornillo, Jr.,
CTA Executive Director,
and Candidate (Dem.) for
State Rep., Dist. 103
1809 Brickell Avenue
Miami, Florida 33129
Phone: 854-0220
September 30, 1972
EDITORIAL REPLY

------------------------------------- 30,32
Since the Herald has chosen to publicly attack my
record, accomplishments, and positions on various issues,
and those of the CTA, I again request that under Florida
Statue 104.38, the Herald print the following record of
affirmative and legal action.

'ATUTES

--------------------- passim

In 1968, CTA signed a no-strike affidavit.

·--------------------- 2, 4, 6

In 1969, CTA filed and won a suit in the Supreme
Court of Florida, which gives all public employees the right
to bargain collectively without the right to strike.

2

In 1971, CTA filed the Tornillo suit, which enabled
the School Board to receive $7.6 million and are presently
cooperating with the Board in their effort to retain this
money and avoid further financial chaos.

3

Since 1968, CTA has reimbursed the taxpayers of
Dade County for the full salary and all fringe benefits of
its president.
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Since 1970, CTA has not used the school mail service
to communicate with its members.

TABLE

Since 1970, CTA has paid all costs of payroll deduction of dues for its members.
We have attempted to obey all the laws of the state,
not intentionally violating any, while continuing our efforts to alert the public to the impending financial crisis
facing the schools.

Opinion of the J U8i
298 N.E.2d 82!

Pittsburgh Press. C
Human Relatu

_u.s._

We have, however, also retained our belief in the
right of public employees to engage in political activity
and to support the candidates of our choice, as is the right
of any citizen in this great country of ours.
Aye, there's the rub.

Poughkeepsie Buyij
Newspapers, I:
205 Misc. 982,

* * * *

Resident Participat
322 F. Supp. 1

Red Lion Broadcas
395 u.s. 367 (:

Rosenbloom v. Met~
403 u.s. 29 (1
Shuck v. Carroll I
215 Iowa 1276

'
"'
State v. 'N ews-Jou:
36 Fla. Supp. 1
Ct. 1972) ----····

Terminello v. Chicc
337 U.S. 1 (H
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APPENDIX I
STATE v. NEWS-JOURNAL CORPORATION.

Page

"

Docket 64, Page 2438.

15

County Judge's Court, Volusia County.
February 14, 1972.

12
36 Fla.Supp. 164

.,
3

·---------------------

ROBERT DURDEN, County Judge.
This cause came on to be heard on defendant's motion
to dismiss on January 21, 1972. At said hearing, the court
received a stipulated statement of facts and heard argument by the Volusia County Prosecutor and counsel for
defendant.

3, 16

19

Stipulated facts
15

.................................... 30,32
,.

tates,
23

27

15

The News-Journal Corporation is a Florida Corporation which publishes the Daytona Beach Morning Journal,
a daily newspaper published in Volusia County. On September 29, 1971, there was published in the Daytona
Beach Morning Journal a political article written by the
News-Journal political editor, Ray Ruester, entitled Kane's
City Hall Power Grab. The subject of the article was the
incumbent mayor, Richard Kane, and his aUeged attempts
to create a strong mayor government for the city which,
by charter, has a commission manager form of government.

App. 52
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By a letter dated September 29, 1971, addressed to
the editor, News-Journal Corporation, Richard Kane requested that pursuant to §104.38, Florida Statutes, the
News-Journal Corporation immediately publish a reply
to the column. The material which Mayor Kane sought to
have published as his reply was attached to his letter to
the editor and consisted of an article written by Richard
Kane and previously published in the Halifax Reporter,
a newspaper published in Volusia County, on September
4, 1971.

date immediately publish free of costs any reply
he may make thereto in as conspicuous a place
and in the same kind of type as the matter that
calls for such reply, provided such reply does not
take up more space than the matter replied to.
Any person or firm failing to comply with the
provisions of this section shall, upon conviction,
be guilty of a misdemeanor.

The News-Journal Corporation refused to publish the
material as requested. Mayor Kane thereafter signed an
affidavit and caused a warrant to be issued for the NewsJournal Corporation for violation of §104.38, Florida
Statutes.
The News-Journal Corporation filed its motion to
dismiss contending, inter alia, that §104.38 is unconstitutional under article 1, §4, of the constitution of Florida,
and the first and fourteenth amendments to the constitution of the United States.

The defendant in its motion to dismiss contends that
the above-quoted statute is unconstitutional. This court
agrees with the defendant for the reasons as stated herein.
First, this court recognizes that the intent of the
above-quoted statute is to regulate the press which is
protected by the first amendment to the United States
Constitution and article 1, §4, of the Florida Constitution. The cases limiting restraint of the free press are
numerous. The case of the New York Times Company v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), is recognized as one of
the landmark decisions in dealing with the question of
freedom of the press. Mr. Justice Brennan, rendering the
opinion of the court in that case, stated-

Decision

The general proposition that freedom of expression upon public questions is secured by the
First Amendment has long been settled by our
decisions. The constitutional safeguard we have
said, "was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political
and social changes desired by the people." Roth
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484, 1 L.ed. 2d
1498, 1506, 77 S.Ct. 1304. The maintenance of
the opportunity for free political discussion to the

§104.38, Florida Statutes, provides as followsIf any newspaper in its columns assails the

personal character of any candidate for nomination or for election in any election, or charges
said candidate with malfeasance or misfeasance
in office, or otherwise attacks his official record,
or gives to another free space for such purpose,
such newspaper shall upon request of such candi-

'
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end that government may be responsive to the
will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential
to the security of the republic, is a fundamental
principle of the constitutional system.
Applying the rule of law as set forth therein it is
the opinion of this court that the statute in question imposes an unconstitutional infringement upon the freedom
of the press.
Second, it should be recognized that the statute in
question is a criminal statute, the violation of which is
punishable by fine or imprisonment. It is a well settled
rule of law of this state, and of all other states, that a
criminal statute which either forbids or requires the doing
of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as
to its application, violates the first essential of due process
of law. Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction of Orange
County, Florida, 368 U.S. 278; Aztec Motel, Inc. v. State,
ex rel. Faircloth, 251 So.2d 849 (Florida Supreme Court,
1971); Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1951).
This court is of the opinion that the language of
the statute in question is too vague, indefinite and uncertain to constitute notice of what language may fall
within the purview of the statute and what constitutes a
reply which must be printed at the request of candidates.
This court is of the opinion that this statute is not reasonably definite and certain and that the constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated in that this statute
fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice
of its violation.
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The Miami Herald Publishing Company, a division
of Knight Newspapers, Inc.
Appellant,

v.
Pat L. Tornillo, Jr.,
Appellee.

APPLICATION FOR STAY OF MANDATE OF SUPREME COURT
OF FLORIDA

To the Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court and Circuit Justice for the
Fifth Circuit:
Appellant, The Miami Herald Publishing Company,
a division of Knight Newspapers, Inc. ("The Miami Herald"),
is this day filing a Jurisdictional Statement in this case,
a copy of which is attached to this Application.

Appellant

prays that an order be entered staying the mandate of the
Supreme Court of Florida, which will otherwise issue on
November 20, 1973, pending a final determination of the
matter by this Court.

In support of this Application,

Appellant respectfully shows as follows:
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1.

Appellant is the publisher of a newspaper,

The Miami Herald.

On October 1, 1972, suit was instituted

against The Miami Herald in the Circuit Court for Dade
County, Florida, by Appellee Pat L. Tornillo ("Tornillo")
to obtain a mandatory injunction directing The Miami Herald
to print verbatim a statement by Appellee, and damages.
Tornillo's cause of action was based on Section 104.38, Fla.
Stat., a criminal statute, which makes it a misdemeanor
.\ for a

new~paper

to refuse to publish "any reply" by a

) political candidate to any matter critical of the candidate
published in the newspaper.
2.

The Circuit Court for Dade County dismissed

Tornillo's complaint, and in an opinion dated October 20,
1972, held Section 104.38, Fla. Stat., to be in violation of
the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution,

a~d

Article I of the Florida Constitution.

On

July 18, 1973, the Supreme Court of Florida reversed the
judgment of the Circuit Court, and held that Section 104.38,

I

Fla. Stat., "does not constitute a violation of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States
or Article I, Section 4, Florida Constitution.") The Miami
Herald filed a Petition for Rehearing, which was denied by the
Supreme Court of Florida in an opinion dated October 10, 1973.
Copies of these three opinions are included in the Appendix
to the attached Jurisdictional Statement.
3.

On August 2, 1973, concurrently with the filing

of its Petition for Rehearing,The Miami Herald petitioned the
Supreme Court of Florida pursuant to Rule 3.15 of the Florida
Appellate Rules for an extension of time for issuance of the
Court's mandate and a stay of proceedings in the Florida courts,
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PAUL &

THOMSON, 1300 FIRST NATIONAL BANK BU I LDING, MIAMI, FLOR I DA 33131

should the Petition for Rehearing be denied.

On _October 16, )

1973, the Supreme Court of Florida granted the petition and /·
ordered proceedings to be stayed "to and including November \
19, 1973 to allow [Appellant] to seek review in the Supreme \
Court of the United States and obtain any further stay from
that court."

(Emphasis added)

A copy of that Order is

attached hereto as Exhibit 1.
4.

Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal with the

Supreme Court of Florida on November 1, 1973.

A copy of

that Notice is included in the Appendix to the attached
Jurisdictional Statement.
5.

This Court has jurisdiction to review this

case pursuant to 28

u.s.c.

§1257(2).

Application for the

stay is made pursuant to Rules 18, 50 and 51 of the Rules
of this Court.
6.

Reasons for seeking appeal.

A stay of mandate

pending appellate review by this Court should be granted
where the matters to be raised on appeal "are of such significance and difficulty that there is a }substantial prospect
that they will command four votes for review 1

,..

Organized

Village of Lake v. Egan, 80 S.Ct. 33, 4 L.Ed.2d 34 (1959)
(Opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan as Circuit Justice) and where
the Court will ultimately have jurisdiction over the appeal,
Rosenblatt v. American Cyanamid Company, 86 S.Ct. 1, 15 L.Ed.2d
39 (1965)

(Opinion of Mr. Justice Goldberg as Circuit Justice).

Appellant submits that the major issues to be raised on appeal

l

~

present such substantial constitutional questions as to warrant
a stay under the foregoing

standard~:

-3-
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a.

The unprecedented regulation of the press

permitted by the opinion below is in violation of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
As more fully discussed in the accompanying
Jurisdictional Statement, the decision of the Florida Supreme
Court upholding the constitutionality of Section 104.38, which
requires a newspaper to publish the reply of any candidate in
any state election who is criticized in matter printed in the
newspaper, so basically conflicts with traditional concepts
of freedom of speech and press as to constitute a form of
censorship.

-----.

Although this Court has never decided the

specific constitutional question of whether the government
may command the private press to publish certain information
and ideas, several lower Federal and State Courts have faced
similar issues.

The Florida Supreme Court's opinion in this

case is in direct conflict with these cases.
likelihood of a substantial amount of

fut~re

There is a
litigation of

the question since several states already have such statutes
and at least one other state legislature has considered such
a law in the past year.
b.

The decision below is in serious conflict

with this Court's recent series of cases distinguishing the
broadcast and other news media for purposes of government
regulation.
As discussed in the accompanying Jurisdictional
Statement, the holding of the Florida Supreme Court that a
form of the fairness doctrine may appropriately be applied

--

to the printed media clearly conflicts with this Court's
decision in Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395

u.s. 367

(1969) and in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic
National Committee,

u.s.

__,

36 L.Ed.2d 772 (1973).
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In those cases, this Court took great pains to point out
that any regulation of the broadcast media in terms of
programming content could be justified only by reference
to the physical and technological distinctions between the
broadcast and printed media.

In one stroke, the decision

of the Florida Supreme Court would wipe away that distinction
and permit unprecedented regulation of the press.

Disregard-

ing this Court's denial of any right of guaranteed paid
access to the broadcast media in Columbia Broadcasting, the
decision below would fling open the doors to the pressroom
by permitting free access to a newspaper's columns to any
candidate criticized in the newspaper.
7.

Reasons stay should be granted.

While the opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida announces
a final determination of the issue of the constitutionality
of Section 104.38, it also remands the cause to the trial
court "for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith."
Unless a stay is ordered by this Court, such proceedings may
be commenced on or after November 20, 1973.

The issues to

be resolved in such proceedings could include the factual
questions raised in the complaint and the measure of damages.
If forced to defend such proceedings while prosecuting an
appeal before this

Court, ~~pellant

will_ suffer a _financial

~e~al burden which is irreparable,! An ultimate decisi;n
by this Court holding §104.38, Fla. Stat., unconstitutional
could not restore

th~

time

and , expen~which

The Miami Herald

would have incurred in defending the action in the Florida
courts.

Furthermore, the courts of Florida would be burdened

with the trial of a cause that may

ultimatel~

be mooted by a

decision from this Court.
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While continued proceedings in the Florida courts
will cause considerable harm to The Miami Herald and a
possible unnecessary burden to the judicial system, Appellee
will not suffer any damages if a stay is granted.

Tornillo's .

original prayer for an injunction and a retraction prior to
the election of November, 1972 has long ago been mooted by the
fact that the election has been held, and his only remaining
claim is for damages.

Tornillo will suffer no detriment from

awaiting a final resolution of the question of constitutionality
of Section 104.38 by this Court.
The foregoing factors were recognized by the attached
Order of the Supreme Court of Florida staying proceedings through
November 19, 1973, which expressly contemplates this Court's
granting a further stay in this case.
WHEREFORE, Appellant prays that the judgment and
mandate of the Supreme Court of Florida, which will otherwise
issue on November 20, 1973, be stayed pending a final
disposition of this case by this Court.
Respectfully submitted,

~s.CJ.?~

~affey~' Jk·
PAUL & THOMSON
1300 First National Bank Building
Miami, Florida
33131
(305) 371-5461
Counsel for Appellant
Of Counsel:

(i?~"d·~
RFar
M.

~

Martin J. Gaynes
Ian D. Volner
COHN & MARKS
1920 L Street, N.
Washington, D. C.

f ~·

w.
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IN THE

SUP~~E

COURT OF FLORIDA

JULY TERM, A. D. 1973
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 16, 1973

**

PAT L. TORNILLO, JR.,

**

Appellant,
vs.

**

THE MIAMI HERALD PUBLISHING
COMPANY, a division of KNIGHT
NEWSPAPERS I INC • I

**

Appellee.

**

CASE NO. 43,009

**
**

Appellee's petition for

~xtension

of time for issuance

of mandate is granted and proceedings in this Court and in the
lower courts are hereby stayed to and including November 19, 1973,
to . allow appellee to seek review in the Supreme Court of the United
States and obtain any further stay from that court.

-.

A True Copy
TEST:

~....

:;;;:.:.::=:.*,....., ..J~ .. ~

«""
..

s~~:~~~ite'r

c~preme court.

sg
cc:

Honorable
Honorable
Honorable
Honorable
Honorable
Honorable
Honorable

James W. Beasley
Tobias Simon
Robert L. Shevin
Jonathan L. Alpert
William c. Ballard
Donald U. Sessions
Richard P. Brinker

EXHIBIT 1.

~~

--·---

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing
Application for Stay of Mandate of Supreme Court of Florida
was served this 19th day of November, 1973 upon Mr. Tobias
Simon, Attorney for Appellant, 1492 South Miami Avenue,
Miami, Florida

PAUL &

33130, by personal delivery.
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~u.prtmt

<!Jrutrt o-f tlrt ~tb ~tmes
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November 20, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JUSTICE POWELL
SUBJECT: The Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, A-504
(No. 73-797) (Application for Stay)

IMMEDIATE SITUATION: A Florida Circuit Court held
unconstitutional a Florida criminal statute which makes it a
misdemeanor for a newspaper to refuse to publish a reply by a
p olitical candidate to any matter critical of the candidate published
in the newspaper. The Florida SC reversed and remanded the ca.se
back to the trial court for trial on the complaint for injunction. Tn e
SC stayed its mandate through November 19 (Monday) to allow applicant
to seek review "and obtain any further stay" in this Court.
FACTS: Respondent, who was a candidate for the state
legislature, demanded that applicant rint verbatim his replies to
two editorials relatmg to his can .idacy for public office. Applicant
r~d and respondent filed compl aint t or declaratory and injunctive
relief seeking to enforce by civil action Florida Statute 104. 38 which
p rovides:

§ 104. 38 News p aper assailing candidate in an
election; space for reply. -- If any news p aper in its
columns as sails the personal cha~acter of any
candidate for nomination or for election in any
election, or chaf ges said candidate with malfeasance
or misfeasance in office, O&S>~ e attacks his
o!§si~ --~~.rd, or gives to another free space for such
purpose, such newspaper shall upon request of such
candidate immediately publish free of cost any reply
he may make thereto in as consp.cuous a place and
in the same kind of type as the matter that calls for
such reply, provided such reply does not take up
more space than the matter replied to. Any person or

- 2 firm failing to comply with the provisions of this
section shall be g~ilty of a misdemeanor of the
first degree . . . .
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the
Florida statute was an unconstitutional infringement upon freedom of
speech and press and because the statute was impermissibly vague and
indefinite.
The SC of Florida (Per Curiam; Boyd, diss.) reversed and
remanded. On October 10, 1973, the Florida SC denied a rehearing.
On October 16, the SC granted a stay of its mandate to and including
November 19 to allow applicant to seek review before this Court and
to 11 obtain any further stay from that court. 11
Applicant filed the instant application and Jurisdictional Statement
on November 19.
RATIONALE OF THE FLORIDA SC: Recognizing that there is a
right to publish without prior governmental restraint, the SC emphasized
that there is a correlative responsibility that the public be fully informed
and that the public 11 need to know 11 is most critical during an election
campaign. To these ends the court found that the Florida statute
11
enhances 11 rather than abridges freedom of speech and press.
The SC found the Florida statute designed to add to the flow of
information and ideas and that it does not constitute an incursion upon
First Amendment rights or a prior restraint, since no specified
newspaper content is excluded.
The SC noted a tendency towards monopolizationof the press and,
citing Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), found that '' "
it is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited
market place of ideas wherein truth will prevail rather than to countenance
a monopolization of that market whether by government or private
enterprise.
In upholding the Florida 11 right-of-reply 11 statute, the SC noted
this Court's reference to such statutes in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
403 U.S. 29, 47, n. 15.

The Florida SC also found the statute sufficiently explicit to
inform those who are subject to it as to what conduct will render them
liable to its penalties.

- 3 -

CONTENTIONS OF APPLICANT: Noting that this Court has
never ruled directly upon a state statute requiring newspaper publication
of a reply, applicant argues that the decision below is in conflict with
the rationale of this Court in such cases as Red Lion and Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 36
L. Ed. 2d 772 ( 1973 ).
Citing Associates & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440
F. 2d 133 (9th Cir. 1971), applicant contends that the Florida SC erred
in its apparent conclusion that regulations which affirmatively require
publication somehow stand on a different constitutional footing than
regulations prohibiting publication.
Noting the Florida SC' s reliance on the constitutional recognition
given the 11 Fairness Doctrine 11 by this Court in Red Lion and Columbia
Broadcasting, applicant urges that that doctrine can be sustained in
those media only because of the unique characteristics of electronic
communication. Citing Columbia Broadcasting, applicant argues that
the state court erred in drawing an analogy between the broadcast and
the print media.
Applicant contends that the Florida statute represents an
abridgement of a basic and vital constitutional protection provided
to the press by the First Amendment, imposing governmental controls
on editorial decisions to publish critical stories about political candidates.
Citing numerous (6) ambiguities in the statute, applicant also
argues that the statute's vagueness and ambiguity increases its unconstitutional effect upon legitimate expression.
Applicant states that if the Florida SC' s mandate is not stayed,
proceedings in the trial court may commence on or after November 20
and that it will suffer a financial and legal burden which is irreparable
-- that an ultimate favorable decision by this Court could not restore
the time and expense which applicant would have incurred in defending
the action in the Florida courts.
On the other hand, applicant argues that respondent 1 s original
complaint for an injunction has been mooted by the fact that the election
has been held, and his only remaining claim is for damages.
Furthermore, applicant suggests that the Florida SC order
staying its mandates through November 19 expressly contemplates
this Court's granting a further stay in this case.

;

"

- 4 DISCUSSION: This case appears to be an important one of
first impression before the Court and one the Court may well want to hear.
The constitutionality of the "fairness doctrine" as applied in
the broadcast media has been recognized, and some of its limitations
established, by this Court. Although the Court• s dicta would suggest
that a similar doctrine would be inapplicable to the press, or, at
least its limitations more constricted, the question apparently is not
free from doubt. In this regard, it is noted that in Rosen bloom the
Court specifically noted that state right-of-reply statutes were a possible
solution to the fear that private citizens will not be able to respond
adequately to publicity involving them. 403 U.S. at 47. While the
reference may be read narrowly in the factual context of thfll-t case,
the footnote cited a law review note advocating a right to reply for
political candidates. Note, Vindication of the Reputation of a Public
Official, 80 Har. L. Rev. 1730, 1745- ~n any event, it would appear
doubtful whether this Court would ~e~esant 'a crim"nal right-to-reply
statute such as the one here.
It should be noted that the .1\t..torney ~~ 1 of Florida has
indicated in another case involving the same statute that he has
reservations about its constitutionality. Opinion of Circuit Court,
J. S. at App. 32. He also joined applicant on the petition for rehearing
urging the Florida SC to grant the petition and reverse its initial decision.
Applicant does not make a strong case for irreparable injury.
Granting a stay on the alleged injuries of time and expense involved
in lower court litigation may establish a bad precedent. On the other
hand, however, it J!_o ~ot ~ppear that respondent would suffer any injury
~----- ........... ~
if a stay is granted.

--

~

RECOMMENDATION: This case appears to be significant.
may wish to refer it to the Conference.

You

Balancing the "equities" involved, I am inclined to think that the
stay should be granted. However, there seems to be no immediate
danger of significant injury to applicant and you may wish to call for
a response.
1

Although it s out of my bailiwick, it would appear appropriate
to call for a response to the J. S. from the Florida AG.

~
~
James B • .,...G :-; {

jtlt.Jrrttnt OJ c-urt cf tlTt ~~~ .ita±te

'~fhtsfringtc-n, ~- OJ. 2.0~,~~
C HAMSERS OF

JUSTICE LEWIS F. PO W ELL, JR

November 20, 1973

A-504 The Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
I am sending to each of you with this Memorandum:
(i) Application for Stay of Mandate in the above case;
(ii) Jurisdictional statement filed on behalf of the applicant;
(iii) Memorandum of November 20 from Jim Ginty which
summarizes the facts, decision of the Florida Supreme Court, and the
contentions of the applicant.
Mter conferring with the Chief Justice, I have today signed an
Order in my capacity as Circuit Justice staying the application pending
further order of this Court. In view of the importance of the issue, I
am referring the application to the Court for consideration at our
; "
Conference on November 30.
Sincerely,

(

LFPjr/ gg

(

'- '

I

.

l
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A-504 The Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo

.

"

~·'

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
I am sending to each of you with this Memorandum:

(i) Application for Stay of Mandate in the above ease;
(ii) Jurisdictional statement filed on behalf of the applicant;

(iii) aemorandum of November 20 from Jim Ginty which
summarizes the facts, decision of the Florida SUpreme Court, and the
contentions of the applicant.

,.
.1'.

Mter conferring with the Chief Justice, I have today signed an
Order in my capacity as Circuit Justice staying the application pending
further order of this Court. In view of the importance of the issue, I _ ,
am referring the application to the Court for consideration at our
·
Conference on November 30.

:<

Sincerely,

LFPjr/gg

...
'·',.

A-504 (No. 73-797) The Miami Herald
Pobliehing Co. v. Tornillo
Dear Chief:
The attached application for a stay of IIWldate has been filed
with me as Circuit Justice.

.-t,.

The Florida Supreme Court stayed its mandate through today
to allow an application to be made to us. Thus, I am inclined to aet
today unless you think otherwise. Also, I am inclined to grant a stay
pending action Ill the application by the full Court (at our next
Conference). As you will see from Jim Ginty's memo the case
raises a major question of first impression. I am satisfied that
there will be at least four votes to grant.
I will call you early this afternoon to discuss this, if convenient

with you.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
Enc.

·.
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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JUSTICE POWELL
SUBJECT: The Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, A -504
(No. 73-797) (Application for Stay)

IMMEDIATE SITUATION: A Florida Circuit Court held
unconstitutional a Florida criminal statute which makes it a
misdemeanor for a newspaper to refuse to publish a reply by a
political candidate to any matter critical of the candidate published
in the newspaper. The Florida SC reversed and remanded the case
ba<!k to the trial court for trial on the complaint for injunction. The
SC stayed its mandate through November 19 ( onday) to allow applicant
to seek review "and obtain any further stay" in this Court.
FACTS: Rea_£Q.,nd~nt, who was a candidate for the state
legislature, d~~that applicant pri~t verbati~ his repl~es to
two editorials relating to his candidacy for public office. Applicant
refused and res ondent filed com laint for declaratory and injunctive
relief seekins to enforce by civil action Florida Statute 1
which
provides:
':::::

§ 104. 38 Newspaper assailing candidate in an
election; space for reply. -- If any newspaper in its
columns assails the personal character of any
candidate for nomination or for election in any
election, or cha ges said candidate with malfeasance
or mitfeaaance in office., or otherwise atta.c ks his
official record, or gives to another free space for such
purpose_. such newspaper shall upon request of such
candidate immediately publish free of cost any reply
he may make thereto in aa conap.cuous a place and
in the same kind of type as the matter that calls for
such reply, provided . such reply does not take up
more space than the matter replied to. Any person or

. . zfirm failing to comply with the provisions of thia
section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the
first degree • • • •
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the
Florida statute was an unconstitutional infringement upon freedom of
speech and press and because the statute was impermissibly vague and
indefinite.
The SC of Florida (.!!!.! Curiam; Boyd, dies.) reversed and
remanded. On October 10, 1973, the Florida SC denied a rehearing.
On October 16, the SC granted a stay of ita mandate to and including
November 19 to allow applicant to seek review before this Court and
to "obtain any further stay from that court."
Applicant filed the instant application and Jurisdictional Statement
on November 19.
RATIONALE OF THE FLORIDA SC: Recognizing that there is a
right to publish without prior governmental restraint, the SC emphasiz.e d
that there is a correlative responsibility that the public be fully informed
and that the public "need to know" is most critical during an election
campaign. To these ends the court found that the Florida statute
"enhances" rather than abridges freedom of speech and press.
The SC found the Florida statute designed to add to the flow of
information and ideas and that it does not constitute an incursion upon
First Amendment rights or a prior restraint; since no specified
newspaper content is excluded.
The SC noted a tendency towards monopolizationof the press and,_ _,
citing Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969}, foupd that ·
it is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibit~d
market place of ideas wherein truth will prevail rather than to countenance
a monopolization of that market whether by government or private
enterprise.
I

\
In upholding the Florida "right-of-reply" statute,
this Court• a reference to such statutes in Rosenbloom v. Metromed a,
\
403U.S. Z9. 47, n. 15.
\
\

A

Tlwt Florida SC abo found the statute sufficiently explicit to
inform those who are subject to it aa to what conduct will render them ,
liable to its penaltiee.

/,'

-I\

'

'

..,..

'

CONTENTIONS OF APPLICANT: Noting that this Court bas
never ruled directly upon a atate statute requiring newspaper publication
of a reply, applicant arguea that the decision below is in conflict with
the rationale of this Court in such cases as Red Lion and Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 36
L. Ed. Zd 77Z (197 3 ).
Citing Aseociatee & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440
F. Zd 133 (9th Cir. 1971 ), applicant contends that the Florida SC erred
in its apparent conclulion that regulations which affirmatively require
publication somehow stand on a different conatitutional footing than
regulations prohibiting publication.
Noting the Florida SC1 a reliance on the conatitutional recognition
given the "Fairness Doctrine" by this Court in Red Lion and Columbia
Broadcasting, applicant urget that that doctrine can be euatained in
thoee media only because of the unique characteristics of electronic
communication. Citil'lg Columbia Broadcasting, applicant argue• that
the state court erred in drawing a.a analogy between the broadcast and
the print media.
Applicant contends that the Florida statute represents an
abridgement of a bade and vital conatitutional protection provided
to the press by the First Amendment, imposing governmental controls
on editorial decisions to publish critical stories about political candidates.
Citing numerous (6) ambiguities in the statute. applicant also
arguea that the atatute 1 s vaguenees and ambiguity increa1es ita unconstitutional effect upon legitimate expresaion.
Applicant atates that if the Florida SC• e mandate is not stayed,
,.
proceedings in the trial court may commence on or after November ZO ;
and that it will suffer a financial and legal burden which is irreparable
... that an ultimate favorable decieion by this Court could not restore
the time and expense which applicant would have incurred in defending
the action in the Florida courta.
On the other hand. applicant argues that reapondentt s original
complaint for an injunction has been mooted by the fact that the election
has been held,. and his only remaining daim i8 for damage1.
Furthermore. applicant auggeata that the Florida SC order
staying ita mandatee through November 19 expressly contemplates
this Court•e granting a further atay in this caae.

DISCUSSION: This case appears to be an important one of
first impression before the Court and one the Court may well want to hear.
The constitutionality of the "fairness doctrine" as applied in
the broadcast media has been recognized, and some of its limitations
established, by this Court. Although the Court• s !!!E!! would suggest
that a similar doctrine would be inapplicable to the press, or, at
least ite limitations more constricted, the question apparently ie not
free from doubt. In this regard, it is noted that in Rosenbloom the
Court specifically noted that state right .. of•reply statutes were a possible
solution to the fear that private citizens will not be able to respond
adequately to publicity involving them. 403 U.S. at 47. While the
reference may be read narrowly in the factual context of th case,
the footnote cited a law review note advocating a right to reply for
political candidates. Note, Vindication of the Reputation of a Public
Official, 80 Har. L. Rev. 1730, 1745-47. In any event, it would appear
doubtful whether this Court would consonant a criminal right .. to- reply
statute such as the one here.

. '·
.'
,.
'

\.

~+

It should be noted that the Attorney General of Florida has
indicated in another case involving the same statute that he has
reservations about its constitutionality. Opinion of Circuit Court,
J. S. at App. 3Z. He also joined applicant on the petition for rehearing
urging the Florida SC to grant the petition and reverse ita initial decision.
Applicant does not make a strong case for irreparable injury.
Granting a stay on the alleged injuries of time and expense involved
in lower court litigation may establish a bad precedent. On the other
hand. however, it doee not appear that respondent would suffer any injury
if a stay is granted.
RECOMMENDATION: This c:ate appears to be significant.
may wish to refer it to the Conference.

You

Balancing the "equitiel 11 involved, I am inclined to think that the
etay should be granted. However, there aeems to be no immediate
danger of significant injury to applicant and you may wiah to call for
a response.
Although ita out of my bailiwick, it would appear appropriate
to call for a response to the J. S .. from the Florida AG.

James B. Ginty

...

·';•

.•,
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OF MANDATE OF SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
WHILE FLORIDA STATUTE §104.38 makes the newspaper
I

publisher's refusal to grant access for a reply a misdemeanor,
the Plaintiff in this cause sought declaratory and injunctive
relief and punitive damages only.

The Supreme Court of Florida

f

held these

ivil remedies ·were available to the Plaintiff under

the statute and the applicable state law; indeed, it added that:
"The criminal penalty can be easily severed
and deleted and ' still leave complete legislative
expression establishing a civil right to damages."
(Order Denying Rehearing, Appendix to Jurisdictional Statement, page 27)
The complaint in this matter was filed two days before,
and a hearing was held one day before, the 1972 primary elections
for the State Legislature.
other responsive pleading.

THE MIAMI HERALD filed no answer or
1

Its defenses to the civil relief

prayed for in the complaint, other than its assertion of the
statute's invalidity under the First Amendment, if any, are still
officially unstated.

However, the Appellant's Brief filed in the

Supreme Court of Florida suggests that the MIAMI HERALD is protecting its flanks with a number of subsidiary and independent
1.

The parties as well as the court below, treated the hearing as
if a demurrer or motion to dismiss were pending. The trial judge,
in fact, "dismissed" the suit "with prejudice''. On appeal,
the Supreme Court of Florida reversed, stating "the cause is
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith."
(Opinion of Florida Supreme Court, Appendix
to Jurisdictional Statement, page 19.)
-1-
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. ...
factual defenses, quite separate from the sole constitutional
question now before this Court. 2
On page 26 of its Florida Supreme Court Brief, THE
MIAMI HERALD candidly and forthrightly admits:
1

"It is conceivable that some type of 'reply' (
statute could be drafted which could meet
(
the test of the First Amendment."
And, assuming the existence of a statute, when appeals
are exhausted

it reserves the right to assert that the subject

candidatorial attacks were not proscribed thereby; and if so, the
statute would not compel publication of these particular responses
because they are nonresponsive.

THE MIAMI HERALD has not conceded

the finality of the judgment affected by this appeal!

Thus, from

page 21 of the HERALD Brief:
"--What kinds of publications give rise to a
requirement of printing a reply? The statute
provides right of reply when a newspaper makes
a publication 'in its columns?' Does this mean
any publication of any nature in a newspaper?
Does it include news articles? Editorials?
'Columns?' Advertisements? Letters to the
Editor? Does it include only publications originated by the newspaper or does it also include
publication of articles from news syndicates,
such as the Associated Press, or syndicated
columns?
--What is the nature of publications which give
rise to a right of reply? The statute applies
when a newspaper 'assails the personal character
of a candidate ... or charges said candidate with
malfeasance or misfeasance in office, or otherwise
attacks his official record •.. '
Is an endorsement
of one candidate an 'attack' on his opponent? Cf.,
Ex Parte Hawthorne, 116 Fla." 608, 156 So. 619, 625 (1934) (concurring opinion of Justice Buford).
Does the statute apply only if a candidate is
libeled? Cf., Manasco v. Walley, supra. What
is the 'personal character' of a person? Cf.,

2.

Objections on vagueness grounds have been effectively overcome
by the Florida Supreme Court's own gloss on the statute:
"Because of the longstanding policy of this Court
to give a statute, if reasonably possible, a construction supporting its constitutionality, we
hold that the mandate of the statute refers to
'any reply' which is wholly responsive to the
charge made in the editorial or other article in
a newspaper being replied to and further that
such reply will be neither libelous nor slanderous of the publication nor anyone else, nor vulgar
nor profane."
(Opinion of the Florida Supreme
Court, Appendix to Jurisdictional Statement, pg. 16.)

-2-

TOBIAS SIMON & ELIZABETH duFRESNE , A PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION , SUITE 208 1492 SOUTH MIAMI AVENUE , MIAMI, FLORIDA 33130

Firestone v. Time, Inc.,
So.2d
(Fla. 1972)
Case No. 41,868).
Is the statute invoked by a
publication of an opinion or comment, or does it
also come into play when a factual publication is
made? Does the statute apply regardless of whether
the factual matter is true or not?
--To elections for what offices does the statute
apply? Federal offices? State offices? County
or municipal offices?
--What type of reply is required to be published?
Does the newspaper have the power to refuse to
publish obscene or defamatory replies? Cf.
Opinion of the Justices, supra, at 921.
--Where must the reply be printed? The statute
calls for publication of the reply in 'as conspicuous a place' as the initial publication, but
this standard is totally subjective.
Is page four
of a newspaper as 'conspicuous' a place as page
five? Is the editorial page as 'conspicuous' a
place as the front page?
--How lengthy a reply must be published? If a
newspaper prints a news article describing a
gambling raid, and identifies a candidate as having
been arrested, does the candidate have a right to
a two or three word reply (in equal length to the
number of words in his name) or a reply equal to
the length of the entire article, even though the
candidate may be mentioned only incidentally?"
Appellee believes it is not without significance that
in Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 16 L.Ed. 2d 484, 86 S.Ct. 1434,
this Court held· a challenge to the Alabama State Corrupt Practices
Act involving prosecution for publishing an editorial on election
day as final

(for the purposes of 28

trial had taken place below.

u.s.c.

\

1257) although no

The reason for the finality is that

this Court found that the Alabama Supreme Court had rendered a
judgment binding upon the trial court "that it must convict Mills
under this state statute if he wrote and published the editorial."
Mills conceded that he did write the editorial and that
therefore he had no defense in the Alabama trial court.
In Mercantile National Bank v.

Lan~u,

,.....

371 U.S. 555,

9 L.Ed. 2d 523, 83 S.Ct. 520, "finality" was established because
there was involved:
"A separate and independent matter, anterior
to the merits and not enmeshed in the factual
and legal issues comprising the Plaintiff's
cause of action."
If THE MIAMI HERALD PUBLISHING COMPANY will concede
that it has nothing more Lo present to the trial court and that
-3-
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as a practical matter, the judgment is final against it on all
issues

that if it loses this appeal, it must publish the replies

and/or be liable for such damages as may be proved -- this threshold
difficulty to both jurisdiction and the granting of a stay, may be
obviated.

Unfortunately, and we invite a statement from the Appellant

to the contrary, THE MIAMI HERALD PUBLISHING COMPANY seeks to assert
that the Florida Supreme Court order was "final" while purporting to
preserve independent and factual defenses for its forthcoming trial --

-------

if the decision below should be affirmed.
But for the nagging question of the finality of the
decision of the Supreme Court of Florida, the Appellee agrees that
the matters raised on appeal are of ·such magnitude as to warrant
full review by the Supreme Court of the United States.
'

The federal

issues that have been raised and preserved are clearly "substantial".
With or without a formal stay order, the Appellee will not seek
further relief from the state courts of Florida pending disposition
of the present appeal.
However, a continuation of the Appellant's written
attitudes to the posture of the case reflect upon the possibility
that jurisdiction may be declined; and to this extent,
upon the disposition of Mr. Justice Powell's stay order.

may bear
Appellee

will approach the matter in greater detail in our forthcoming
to the Jurisdictional Statement.

We have no other objections to the

~-------------------------------·

continuation of the stay pending final disposition of this matter

~----------------------------------------------------------------------~

on appeal.

Respectfully submitted,

TOBIAS SIMON
TOBIAS SIMON & ELIZABETH duFRESNE, P.A.
1492 South Miami Avenue
Miami, Florida 33130
JEROME BARRON, ESQ.
The George Washington University
National Law Center
Washington, D.C.
Counsel for Appellee
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~omFlaSC

-~

{AA rr

J

\
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\

~t fY' df'

v

.

TORNILLO

(Carlton, Adkins, McCain, Dekle,
Rawls, p. c.; Roberts, specially
concurring; Boyd, dissenting)
State Civil

Timely : "

~ ~tui'
l. Appellee brought an action in Circuit Court, Dade County
~~~(Christie) for declaratory and injunctive relief and p~itive damages agamst

;.vL

ftJ

appellant for appellant's refusal to publish appellee's reply to editorials
concerning appelle.e' s candidacy for a seat in the Florida House of Representatives.

The Court dismissed the action, declaring Fla. Stat. 104. 3 8,

under which the action was brought, unconstitutional as violative of the

- 2 First Amendment and as impermissibly vague.

The Fla SC, in a

per curiam decision (Carlton, Adkins, McCain, Dekle, Rawls, p. c.;
Roberts, specially concurring; Boyd, dissenting) reversed the lower court,
holding the statute constitutional, and remanding to the trial court for
further proceedings not inconsistent with its decision.
Appellant claims that Fla. Stat. 104.38 is unconstitutional in that it
violates the First Amendment and requirements of due process.

Appellee

raises a jurisdictional question of finality of the state court judgment.
-

2.

"

~

FACTS: Appellee Tornillo was a candidate for the Democratic

Party nomination for a seat in the Florida House of Representatives in the
fall of 1972, when on Sept. 20 and Sept. 29, 1972, appellant published
··

eci'itori·al~ harsl~.1y 'c'riti'cal ·of app~lle~' s
,· ' '

/

• •

•

'

t'

candidacy.
I

Appellant termed a strike

•

which appellee led as an illegal act, and termed the election of appellee as
"inexcusable." App. 45.

Appellant stated that appellee had for years "been

kicking the public shin to call attention to his shakedown statesmanship ••
Give him public office, says Pat [appellee, Pat L. Tornillo, Jr. ], and he
will no doubt live by the Golden Rule.

-

~

Our translation reads that as m 'ore gold

and more rule." App. 4 7.
Appellee demanded that appellant print verbatim his replies to the, two
editorials.

Appellant refused and appellee filed a civil complaint seeking

injunctive relief and punitive damages.
that appellee sought declaratory relief.)

(The Fla SC and appellee also state

- 3 -

Fla.

St~04.

----§ 104.38

38 reads as follows:

Newspaper assailing candidate for
election; space for reply. -- If any newspaper in its
columns a;sails the personal character of any candidate for nomination or for election in' any election,
or charges said candidate with malfeasance or misfeasance in office, or otherwise attacks his official
record, or gives to another free space for such
purpose, s_~ch newspaper f?hall u on re uest~ sue~
candidate immediate y publish free of c~t any rep!y
he mayrnake thereto in as conspicuous a place and in
the same kind of type as the matter that calls for such
reply, provided such reply does not take up more
space than the matter replied to. Any person or firm
failing to comply with the provisions of this section
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree,
punishable as provided in § 775. 082 or § 775. 083.
A candidate "shall mean an:Y person who has filed his qualification papers,
· ·,
J-.

-.t:',,,

~. nd

~. J-

paid his qualifying fees as req'lfired by law." Fla. Stat. 97. 021{18).
,

,

·

t

. • . \.

.· . '

,• • ' ··· I.:

"'

•

I

This statute, passed in largely the sam:e· form as ·it exists now in ·

.'

--1913, was held constitutional by the Fla SC as a means to increase the flow
of information to make a more and better informed electorate.

The SC noted

the increasing concentration of the ownership of the mass media into fewer
and fewer hands, which fact jeopardizes the ability of the public to make "
enlightened choices concerning public controversies.
in

~ecision on Red Lion Broadcasting Co.

v. F. C.

The SC relied heavily

C.~

395 U.S. 367 {1969),

and stated that it could take into consideration the principles enunciated
therein since "dissemination of news other than purely local is transmitted
over telegraph wires or over air waves." App. 18.

The SC held the statute

not vague or overbroad, and restricted "any reply," to one that is wholly
responsive to the charges made in the paper and ~hich is not libelous,

•.

- 4 slanderous, vulgar or profane.

-------::J1:

App. 16.

-

Contrary to the impression of

appellant, J. S., p. 8, the Fla SC did not, it appears, approve, at least in

-

the instant case, the appropriateness of an injunction issuing under 104. 38:

--

Neither appellant nor appellee takes issue with the
holding of the trial court that it lacked jurisdiction to
enjoin an alleged violation of Florida Statute 104. 38.
This provision is criminal in nature and absent special
circumstances equity will usually not enjoin commission
Jof a crime. (App. 13) (footnote omitted)

-----

...

f

t

T he Fla SC also seems to have attempted to restrict its holding as to the

I

constitutionality of the statute to whatever civil remedies .may be possible

t

thereunder, although this is unclear.

In its opinion on the petn for rehearing,

the Fla SC (per curiam, with Boyd dissenting without opinion) stated that since
~:.:

l(o' ·crifl1:inal penalty. was being imposed, its validity vel non "is not here

. ..... . ~

J.

'

-.

.

involved.

'

II

.

.

.

App. 26.

.

'

.

Yet the

..

'

..

'

.

sc·hnrriediately ther,eafter defends

the constitu-

"'tionality of the statute in its entirety, and, at App. 27, states (by negative
implication) as a finding of the SC that the statute is "sufficiently definite and
.

.

specific to support a criminal penalty.''
3.

CONTENTIONS:

-,

(a) Appellant contends that the issue of the constitutionality of 'this
statute is important and novel.
Amendment rights.
ot~erwise

The statute violates appellant's First

Compelling a newspaper to publish that which it would

not print is as much of an unconstitutional fetter on press freedom

under the First Amendment as any prohibition as to what the paper can print.
Appellant relies principally on Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic
National Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
supra, must be limited to broadcasters.

Red Lion Broadcasting v. F.C.C. ,

- 5 Appellee agrees that the First Amendment issues here present
significant federal questions: does the right of reply statute implement or
impede the effectuation of freedom of speech?

Appellee's position is that

right of reply statutes advance the cause of free speech.

Appellee further

asserts that any incidental infringement on freedom of speech by Florida's ·
right of reply statute is outweighed by the state's exercise of its police power
to aid ·p olitical expression and insure the integrity of the electoral process.
(b) Appellant claims that the statute is vague and ambiguous, and
"

so fails to properly inform persons of those acts which might be held
illegal under the enactment.
Appellee disagrees.

The Fla SC has adequately defined the statute

in its opinions in this case. · . 4t any rate, criminal penalties are not herein
involved, and the Fla SC has indicated that the criminal penalty is a severable
part of the statute.
(c) Appellant contends that
the opinion and judgment of the Florida Supreme Court
are final for purposes of 28 U.S. C. § 1257(2). The
Florida Supreme Gourt conclusively decided the
controlling constitutional issue, and its decision,
which is binding upon the trial court, is therefore
reviewable by this Court • • • • (J. S., p. 3, cases
omitted. )
Appellee, relying principally on Mills v. Alabama, 3 84 U.S. 214 (196 5 ),
contends that the decision is final only if statutory construction and factual
defenses which migh t be asserted by appellant on remand are conceded.
Appellant has not conceded these defenses and appears to be reserving them

- 6 for the further proceedings to be had in state trial court.

While in Mills,

appellant conceded that the only defense he had was a constitutional one,
appellant here appears to reserve a variety of nonconstitutional defenses.
"Appellee believe s that it is necessary for Appellant to make a further
statement on the question of whether they [sic] are res erving a variety
of independent defenses of a factual and statutory construction nature."
Response, p. 7.

Appellee apparently believes that injunctive relief is still

available in the case.

Ibid.

(d) Amici have filed eight briefs in support of the jurisdictional

·---

-----

----

statement, all basically tracking the arguments set out by appellant.

Amici

are Dow Jones & Co., New York Times Co., New York News, Inc., American

\. .__.
0.

I

.

Newspa per Publishers. As·soc., . T~mes Mirror Co., American Civil Liberties
I

'

'

.

.

. •

Union, ACLU of Florida, Washingt4 n Post Co., Reporters

Committee~ r

Freedom of the Press Legal Defense and Research Fund, Art Buchwald,
Horance G. Davis, Jr., James J. Kilpatrick, Anthony Lewis, Robert D.

"-----1

Novak, Carl T. Rowan, Hugh Sidey, Thomas G. Wicker, Jules J. Whitcover,
Chicago Tribune Company, Gore Newspapers Company, and Sentinel Star
Company.

4.

DISCUSSION: Many of the opinions in CBS v. DNC have language

critical of such regulation as is here under attack.

See, 412 U.S., at 117-

118 (Opinion of Burger, C. J. ); 144-145 (Stewart, J., concurring); 150-153
(Douglas, J., concurring in judgment); 182 n. 12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
But, see Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 47 n. 15 (Gpinion of

- 7 Brennan, J. ).

The First Amendment issues presented by this case appear

to be of importance.
The jurisdictional problem does seem to be a significant barrier to the
noting

o! thi~ _case

at the present time.

Appellant has not conceded his

non-constitutional defenses on remand, and if this Court were to rule that the
Fla statute was constitutional, there is nothing now to prevent appellant from
returning to the Fla courts and defeating appellee's action on the nonconstitutional merits of the case.

Appellee appears to be mistaken, though,

in assuming that appellant's concessions would require appellant to print
appellee's reply or replies.
in this case by the Fla SC.

Injunctive relief appears to have been ruled out
See, SJ..Ipra.

concede liability for punitive damages.

Appellant would probably have to
Even then the judgment would not be

--final unless the appellant and appellee agreed as to the amount of damages
which would be due.

"[T]he requirement of finality has not been met

merely because the major issues in a case have been decided and only a few

-

,

loose ends remain to be tied up -- for example, where liability has been

determined and all that needs to be adjudicated is the amount of damages."
Republic Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 68 (1948).

Appellee has

provided no indication of willingness to settle on a figure of damages for
purposes of allowing appellant to claim jurisdiction in this Court.

It seems

highly unlikely that the parties could stipulate punitive damages or that this
Court c_ould devise procedures for causing such to happen.

Appellee apparentl y

believes that he is not required to take any steps for jurisdiction to obtain.

- 8 There is a res pons e.
Fergenson

Fla SC and Circuit Ct
Ops in J. S. appx

1/2/74

,.
JA

NOTE: Although this case is "straight-lined" with No. 73-751 on the
Conference List, the two cases have nothing whatsoever to do with each
other.
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To: Mr.

Jus~ ?:e.

Mr. Justice Brennan

.M:r. Justice Stewart
.M:r. Justice White

Mr. Justice Marshall
.M:r. Justice Blackmun
Kr • Justice Powell ,/

.M:r. Juetioe Rehnquist

2nd DRAFT'

From: The ChieL Justlce

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED ST!~ES-ated: _ _ __
Recirculated:
No. 73-797
The Miami Herald Publishing
Company, A Division of
Knight Newspapers,
On Appeal from the SuInc., Appellant,
preme Court of Florida.

v.
Pat L. Tornillo, Jr.
[June -, 1974]
MR. CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER delivered the opinion of
the Court.
The issue in this case 1s whether a state statute grant·
ing a political candidate a right to equal space to reply to
criticism and attacks on his record by a newspaper, violates the guarantees of a free press.

I
In the fall of 1972. appellee, Executive Director of the
Classroom Teachers Association, apparently a teachers'
collective-bargaining agent, was a candidate for the
Florida House of Representatives. On September 20,
1972, and again on September 29, 1972, appellant printed
editorials harshly critical of appellee's candidacy. 1 In
1

The text of thf' September 20, 1972, editorial i::; as follow::; :
"The State's Laws And Pat Tornillo
"LOOK who '::; upholding the law!
''Pat Tornillo, boss of the C!as::;room Teachers Association an<l
candidate for the State LPglslature in the Oct . 3 runoff election, has
clenouncect hi;; opponcut as lacking 'the knowledge to be a legislator,

JUN
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response to these editorials appellee demanded that
appellant print verbatim his replies, defending the role
of the Classroom Teachers Association and the organization's accomplishments for the citizens of Dade County.
Appellant declined to print the appellee's replies, and
appellee brought suit in Circuit Court, Dade County,
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and actual and
punitive damages in excess of $5,000. The action was
as evidenced by his failure to file a list of contributions to and expenditures of lm campaign as rcqmred by law.'
"Czar Tornillo calls 'vwlatwn of thiS law inexcusable.'
"Tins is the same Pat Tornillo who led the CTA strike from
February 19 to March 11, 1968, against the school children and taxpayers of Dade County. Call it whatever you will, it was an illegal
act again~t the public mtrrest and clearly prohibited by the statutes.
"We cannot say it would be illegal but certainly it would be inexcusable of thr voters if tlwy sent Pat Tornillo to Tallahassee to
occupy the scat for Di~trirt 103 in the House of Representatives."
The text of the September 29, 1972, editorial is as follows:
"FROM the people who brought you this-the teacher strike of
'68--come now mstructionR on how to vote for responsible government, 1.e., agam:;t Crutcher Harrison and Ethel Beckham, for Pat
Tornillo. The tracts and blurbs and bumper stickers pile up daily in
teachers' school mailboxeH amid~t continuing pouts that the School
Board should be delivering all tins at your expense. The screeds
say the strike I<' not an 1s~ue. We say maybe it wouldn't be were it
not a part of a contmuat10n of disregard of any and all laws the
CTA m1ght find aggravatmg. Whether in defiance of zoning laws
at CTA Towers, contractH and laws during the st rike, or more recently statr prohibitions agamst soliciting campaign funds amongst
teachers, CTA sty:; fie and try and sue us-what's good for CTA is
good for CTA and that ~~natural law. Tornillo's law, maybe. For
years now hr ha~; bren kicking the public shin to call attention to his
shakedown statrsmanship. He and whichrver acerbic prexy is in
allrged officr havr alwayH frlt the1r private ventures so chock-full of
pubhe weal that we shonld leap at the chance to nab the tab, be it
half the GlonouH Leader's ;:alary or the dues checkoff or anything
else except perhaps mileage on the ~;taff hydrofoil. Give him public
office, ~ays Pat, and he will no doubt live by the Golden Rule. Our
translation read~J that a,_. more gold and more rule."

73-797-0PINION
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premised on Florida Statute § 104.38, a "right of reply"
statute which provides that if a candidate for nomination or election is assailed regarding his pers6'nal characte't
oT official record by any newspaper, the cantlidt:tte has th~
right to demand that the newspaper print, fre~ of cost to
the candidate. any reply the candidate may make to the
newspaper's charges. The reply must appear in as con•
spicuous a place and in the same kind of type as the
,charges which prompted the reply, provided it does not
take up more space than the charges. Failure to comply
with the statute constitutes a first-degree misdeameanor. 2
Appellant sought a declaration that § 104.38 was
unconstitutional. After an emergency hearing requested
by appellee, the Circuit Court denied injunctive relief
because, absent special circumstances, no injunction will
lie against the comrnission of a crime, and that § 104.38
was unconstitutional as an infringement on the freedom
of the press as protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution. Tornillo v . .Miami
Herald Publishing Co., 38 Fla. Supp. 80 (1972). The
Circuit Court concluded that dictating what a newspaper
must print was no different from dictating what it must
not print. The Circuit Judge viewed the statute's vagueness as serving "to restrict and stifle protected expres"104.:38 N eu•spaper assa!lmg candtdate m an election,· space for
reply-If any newspaper in 1ts columns a::;::;ails the personal charac~
tor of any candidate for nommation or for election in any election, or
charges ~a1d candidate with malfea::;anre or mi~feasance in office, or
otherWl::;e attacks hi::; official record, or gives to another free space
for ~uch purpo~e, ::;urh newspaper shall upon request of such candidatr Immediately publish frrr of cost any rE'ply h!c' may make thereto
in as conspicuous a placr and in the same kind of type as the matter
that calls for :>urh reply, provJdlc'd such r!c'ply doE's not take up more
;;parr than the matter r£>plied to . Any pcrt;on or firm failing to
comply w1th thE' provision;; of tlu:; ::;cctJOn ~hall br guilty of a misdemeanor of th£> fir::;t ckgrf'e, puni::;habl(' a::; prov1ded in § 775,082 or

~.

2

-' ,

§ 77fi ,80~ ."

'
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J
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sion.'" 38 Fla. Supp., at 83. Appellee's cause was dismissed with prejudice.
On direct appeal, the Florida Supreme Court reversed
holding that t..lole Gil ettit c~HiPt ttna l:!elft. ~ 104.38 did not
viOlate constitutional guarantees. Tornillo v. Miami
Herald Publishing Co., 287 So. 2d 78 (1973).~ It held
that free speech was enhanced and not abridged by the
Florida right of reply statute, which in that court's view.
furthered the "broad societal interest in the free flow of information to the public.'' 287 So. 2d, at 82. It also held
that the statute was not impermissably vague; the
statute informs "those who are subject to it as to what
conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.'' 287 So. 2d, at 85. 1 Civil remedies. including
damages, were held to be available under this statute; the
case was remanded to the trial court for further proceediugs not inconsistent with the Florida Supreme Cour-t's
conclusions.
We postponed decision on jurisdiction pending conF B. (1974).
·fuderation of the merits.

IT
Although both parties contend that this Court has
jurisdiction to review the ,iUdgment of the Florida
:I The Supreme Court did not du.;turb tiH' Circuit ·Court's holding
that mjunctivf> relief waH not proper m tim; ca~ evE>n if the :;tatute
WE're con:;ttt utional. Accordmg to the Supreme Court neither side
took is:-;ue with that part of the Circmt Court's decisfon. 287-So. 2c1;

at 85
4

the

The Supr<.'me Court placed the foltowmg lunitmg construction on
~tatute ,

" [ WJe hold that the mandate of the Htatute refers to 'nny reply'
which Is who1ly re:;ponHive to the charge made in the echtorial or
other article m a new~paper hem~ repliE'd to and further that such
reply Will be neither hbelou~ nor slandE'rous of the publieation nor
anyone else, nor vulgar nor profatl(l "
287-So 2d. at 86

·.
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Supreme Court, a suggestion was initially made that the
judgment of the Florida Supreme Court roight not be
"final" under 28 U. S. C. § 1257. 5 . In North Dakota
State Board of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, U. S . - (1973), we reviewed a judgment of the North
Dakota Supreme Court, under which the case had been
remanded so that further state proceedings could be
conducted respecting Snyder's application for a permit
to operate a drug store. We held that to be a final
judgment for purposes of our jurisdiction. Under the
principles of finality enunciated in Snyder's Drug Stores,
the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court in this case
is ripe for review by this Court, 6

~.

'·

III
A

The challenged statute creates a right to reply to press
criticism for a candidate for nomination or election. The
statute was enacted in 1913 and this is only the second
:recorded case decided under its provisions.1
r; Appellee'~ Re~pon::;e to Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement all(l
Motion to Affirm the Judgment Below or, in the Alternative, to Dismiss the Appeal, at 4-7 ,
6 Both appellant and appellee rlaim that the uncertainty of the
constitutional validity of § 104.38 restricts the present exercise of
First Amendment rights . Brief for Appellant, at 41. Brief for Appellee, at, 79. Appellant finds urgency for the present consideration
of the constitutionality of the statute in the upcoming 1974 elections.
Whichever way we were to decide on the merits, it would be intolerable to leave unan::;wered, under these circumstances, an jm.,
portant question of freedom of the press under the First Amendment;
an uneasy and un~>ettled eonstitutional posture of § 104.38 could only
further harm the operation of a free press. Mills v. Alabama, 3&l
U. R 214, 221-222 (1966) (DouGLAS, J., concurring), See also Organization for a Better A-ustin v. Keefe, 402 U. S. 415, 418 n. (1971).
1 In its first court te:>t the statute was declared unconstitutional,.
State v. News-Journal, 36 Fla. Supp.. 164 (Volusia County J . Ct., Fla.

.
-

J

f.

l

,,

.

•

.

'

'·' .

.

73=797-{]t>IN!ON
6

MIAMI HERALD PUBLISHING CO. v. TORNILLO

Appellant contends the statute is void on its face
because it purports to regulate the content of a newspaper in violation of the First Amendment. Alterna·
tively it is urged that the statute is void for vagueness
since no editor could know exactly what words would call
the statute into operation. It is also contended that the
statute fails to distinguish between critical comment
which is and is not defamatory.

B
The appellee and supporting advocates of an enforceable right of access to the press vigorously argue that
Government has an obligation to ensure that a wide
variety of views reach the public.H The contentions of
access proponents will be set out in some detail. 0 , It is
urged that at the time the First Amendment to the
Constitution 10 was enacted in 1791 as part of our Bill
of Rights the press was broadly representative of the
people it was serving. While many of the newspapers
were intensely partisan and narrow in their views, the
press collectively presented a broad range of opinions to
readers. Entry into publishing was inexpensive; pamphlets and books provided meaningful alternatives to the
1972) . In neither of th!:' two :;uJt~, the mstunt act10n and the 1972
action, has the Florida Attorney General defended the statute's
constitutionality
8 S!:'e generally Barron, Acerss to the Press-A New Fir:;t Amendm!:'nt Right, RO Harv. L. Rev. 1()41 (1967).
u For a good overview of the po;;ition of acc!:'Hii advocates see Lange,
the Role of the A(WSE; Doctrinr in the Regulation of the Mass Media:
A Critical Review and Asses;;ment, 52 N. Car. L. Rev. 1, 8-9 (1973)
(herrinafter "Lange")
10
"Congre~s shall make no law respectmg an establishment of
religiOn, or prohibiting the freP exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the pr!:'~;;; or of the right of the people
p!:'aceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances! '
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organized press for the expression of unpopular ideas and
often treated events and expressed views not covered by
conventional newspapers.n A true marketplace of ideas
existed in which there was relatively easy access to the
channels of communication.
Access advocates submit that .although newspapers of
the present are superficially similar to those of 1791 the
press of today is in reality very different from that
known in the early years of our national existence. In
the past half century a communications revolution has
seen the introduction of radio and television into our
lives, the promise of a global community through the
use of communications satellites, and the spectre of a
"wired" nation by means of an expanding cable television network with two-way capabilities. The printed
press, it is said, has not escaped the effects of this revolution. Newspapers have become big business and there
are far fewer of them to serve a larger literate population.'2 Chains of newspapers, national newspapers,
national wire and news services, and one-newspaper
towns/a are the dominant features of a press that has
become noncompetitive and enormously powerful and
influential in its capacity to manipulate popular opinion
and changes the course of events. Major metropolitan
'

1

;

SPC CommJsswn on Freedom of the Pres~, A Free and Respon-

Sible Press 14 {1947) {hereinafter "Commission") .
12 Commission 15.
EvC'n in the last 20 years there has been a significant increase in the number of people likely to read newspapers.
B. Bagdikian, Fat Newspapers and Slim Coverage, Columbia JournalISm Review, Sept.jOct. 1973, at 16.
Ia " Nearly half of U. S. daily newspapers, representing some threefifths of daily and Sunday circulation, are owned by newspaper groups
and chains, including diversified business conglomerates. One newspaper towns have become the rule, with effective competition operating m only 4 percent of our large cities." A Balk, Background
Paper, TwC'ntieth Century Fund Ta~k Force Report for a National
News Council, A Free and Responsivf> Press 18 {1973) . '

..,,
...
'.
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newspapers have collaborated to establish news services
national in scope. 11 Such national news organizations
provide syndicated "interpretative reporting" as well a.
syndicated features and commentary, all of which can
serve as part of the new school of "advocacy journalism."
The elimination of competing newspapers in moat of
our large cities, and the concentration of control of media
that results from the only newspaper being owned by the
same interests which own a televisi011 station and a radio
station, are important components of this trend toward
concentration of control of outlets to inform the public.
The result of these vast changes has been to place in
a few hands the power to inform the American people
and shape public opinion. 1" Much of the editorial
opinion and commentary that is printed is that of syndicated columnists distributed
nationwide
and, as a result,
.
I
we are told, on national and world issues there tends to
be a homogeneity of editorial opinion, commentary, and
interpretative analysis. The abuses of bias and manipulative reportage are, likewise, said to be the result of the
vast accumulations of unreviewable power in the modern
media empires. In effect, it is claimed, the public has
lost any ability to respond or to contribute in a meaningful way to the debate on issues. The monopoly of the
means of communication allows for little or no critical
14 Report of the Task Forcr, Twentieth Century Fund Task Force
Report for a Nat10nal News Council, A Free and Responsive Press
4 (1973)
1
" ''Local monopoly m printed news rmse;; serious questions of
diversity of mformation and opm10n. What a local newspaper does
not print about local affair::; doPs not see general print at all. And
havmg the power to take initiative m rcportmg and enunciation of
opinions, it ha::; extraordinary power to ::;et the atmo~phere and determinr thr trrm::; of local con::;idrration of public i::;surs." B. Bagdikian,
The lJ}formatlon Machmc~ 127 (1971) .

..
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n.nalysis of the media except in professional journals of
very limited readership.
"This concentration-of -nationwide news organizations-like other large institutions-has grown increasingly remote from and unresponsive to the
popular constituencies on which they depend and
which depend on them." Report of the Task Force,
The Twentieth Century Fund Task Force Report
for a National News Council, A Free and Responsive
Press. at 4 (1973) ,
Appellees cite the report of the Commission on Freedom
of the Press, chaired by Robert M. Hutchins, in which
it was stated, as long ago as 1947, that "The right of free
public expression has . .. lost its earlier reality." Commission on Freedom of the Press. A Free and Responsible Press 15,
The obvious solution, which was available to dissidents
at an earlier time when entry into publishing was relatively inexpensive, today would be to have additional
newspapers. But the same economic factors which have
caused the disappearance of vast numbers.af metropolitan
newspapers/!; have made entry into the marketplace of
ideas served by the print media almost impossible, It is
urged that the claim of newspapers to be "surrogates for
the public" carries with it a concomitant fiduciary obligation to account for that stewardship. 17 From this premise
16

The newspapers have persuaded Congress to grant them immunity from the antitrust Jaws in the case of "failing" newspapers
for joint operations. 15 U. S. C. § 1801 et seq.
1 7 "Freedom of the press i;; a right belonging, like all rights in a
democracy, to all the people. As a practical matter, however, it can
be exerc1sed only by those who have effective access to the press.
Where the financial, econom1c and technological conditions limit such
access to a small minority, the exercise of that right by that minority
takes on fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary characteristics." A. MacLeish
ju W. Hocking, Freedom of the Pree!:l, at 99 n. 4 (1947) .
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it is reasoned that the only effective way out of this
dilemma and to provide for some accountability and for
accuracy is for government to take affirmativce action.
The First Amendment right of the public to be informed
is said to be in peril; the "marketplace of ideas" is today
a monopoly co11trolled by the owners of the market.
Proponents of guaranteed access to the press take comfort from language in several of this Court's decisions,
language which suggests that the First Amendment acts
as a sword as well as a shield, ~h1:1-t it imposes obligations
on the owners of the press in addition to protecting the
press from government regulation. In Associated Press
v. United States, 326 U. S. 1, 20 (1945), .the Court, in
rejecting the argument that the press is immune from
the antitrust laws by virtue of the First Amendment,
stated :
"The First Amendment, far from providing an argument against application of the Sherman Act, here
provides powerful reasons to the contrary. That
amendment rests on the assumption that the widest
possible dissemination of information from diverse
and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare
of the public, that a free press is a condition of a
free society. Surely a command that the government itself shall not impede the free flow of ideas
does not afford non-governmental combinations a
refuge if they impose restraints upon that constitutionally guaranteed freedom. Freedom to publish
means freedom for all and not for some. Freedom
to publish is guaranteed by the Constitution, but
freedom to combine to keep others from publishing
is not. Freedom of the press from governmental
intederence under the First Amendment does not
sanction repression of that freedom by private inter..
ests." (Footnote omitted.)
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In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964), the Court spoke of "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." It is argued
that the "uninhibited, robust'' debate is not "wide-open"
but open only to a monopoly in control of the press.
Appellee cites the plura.lity opinion in Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 47 & n. 15 (1971), which
he suggests seemed to invite experimentation by the
States in right to access regulation of the press. 18
Access advocates note that Mn. JuSTICE DouGLAS a
decade ago expressed his deep concern regarding the
effects of newspaper monopolies:
"Where one paper has a monopoly in an area, it
seldom presents two sides of an issue. It too often
hammers away on one ideological or political line
18 "If the Stateo; fear that private citizens will not be able to respond adequately to publicity involving them, the solution lies in the
direction of ensuring their ability to respond, rather than in stifling
public discussion of matters of public concern. 16 • ••
" 16 Some states have adopted retraction statutes or right-of-reply
statutes •••
"One writer, m arguing that the First Amendment itself should be
read to guarantee a right of access to the media not limited to a
right to respond to defamatory falsehoods, has suggested several ways
the law might encourage public discussion. Barron, Acces!l to the
Press-A New First Amendment right, 80 Harv, L. Rev. 1641, 16661678 (1967). It is important to recognize that the private individual
often desires press exposure rithe r for himself, his ideas, or his
causes. Constitutional adiudi'ciation must take into account the
individual's interest in acceRs to the press as well as the individual's
interest in preserving his reputation, even though libel actions by
their nature encourage a narrow view of the individual's interest
since they focus only on situation& where the individual has been
harmed by undesired press attention. A constitutional rule that
deters the press from covering the ideas or activities 'of the private
indtvldual thus conceives the Individual's interest too narrowly ."

f (

I.

•,
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using its monopoly position not to educate people,
not to promote debate, but to inculcate its readers
with one philosophy, one attitude-and to make
money . . . . The newspapers that give a variety of
views and news that is not slanted or contrived are
few indeed. And the problem promises to get
worse ... /' The Great Right (Ed. by E. Cahn),
at 124-125, 127 (1963) .
They also claim the qualified support of Professor
Thomas I. Emerson, who has written that "[a] limited
right of access to the press can be safely enforced,"
although he believes that "[g) overnment measures to
encourage a multiplicity of outlets, rather than compelling a few outlets to represent everybQdy, seems a
preferable cours<:> of action ." T. Emerson, The System
·
of Freedom of Expression 671 (1970)/u

IV
However much validity may be found in these arguments, at each point the implementation of a remedy
such as an enforceable right of access necessarily calls for
some mechanisin, ·either governmental or consenual. 20
If it is governmental coercion, this at once brings about
a confrontation with the express provision:s of the First
10

Professor Emero;on would apparently con:sider regulation of the
nature of § 104.a8 to be constitutionally enforceable~ lc/., at 670-67L
20 The National New:; Council, an independent and voluntary
body concerned with prPss fairneo;s, was crPated in 19?3 following
the publication of the TwentiPth Century Fund's Task Force Report
for a National New:; Council, A Free and Hco;ponsive Press. The
Background Paper attached to the Heport dealt in some detail with
the British Press Council, seen by the author of the paper as having,
of the pre~:; council;; ~n Euro\)C, tho most interest to the Uniteq

State.•
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Amendment and the judicial gloss on that amendment
developed over the years. 2 l
The Court foresaw the problerns relating to government enforced access as early as its decision in Associated
Press v. United States, supra, 326 U. S., at 20 n. 18.
There it carefully contrasted the private "compulsion to
print" callerl for by the Association's Bylaws with the
provisions of the District Court decree against appellants
which "does not compel AP or its members to permit
publication of anything which their 'reason' tells them
should not be published." In Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U. S. 665, 681 ( 1972), we emphasized that the cases then
befor£> us "involve no intrusions upon speech and as·
sembly, no prior restraint or restriction on what the press
may publish, and no express or implied command that
the press publish what it prefers to withhold." In Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National
Committee, 412 U. S. 94, 117 ( 1973), the plurality opinion
observ£>d .
"The power of a privately owned newspaper to
advance its own political, social, and economic views
is bounded by only two factors: first, the acceptance
of a sufficient number of readers-and hence advertisers-to assure financial success; and, second, the
journalistic integrity of its editors and publishers."
An attitude strongly adverse to any attempt to extend
a nght of access to newspapers was echoed by several
Members of this Court in their separate opinions in that
case. 412 U. S .. at 145 ( S'I'EWART. J., concurring); 412
U. S., at 182 n. 12 (BRENNAN, J .. dissenting). H.ecently,
while approvmg a bar against employment advertising
H Berau;;e we hold that § 104.;38 vwl~te::; the First Amendment's
guarantee of a free pre~s we have no occa;;wn to consider appellant's
further argument that thr .~tatute IS lmcon:>tJtutionally vague.

,,
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specifying "male" or "female'' preference, the Court's
opinion in Pittsburg Press Co. v. Human Relations Commission, supra, 413 U. S., at 391, took pains to limit its
holding within narrow bounds :
"Nor, a fortiori, does our decision authorize any
restriction whatever, whether of content ·.or layout,
on stories or commentary o~iginated by Pittsburgh
Press, its columnists, or its contributors. On the
contrary, we reaffirm unequivocally the protection
afforded to editorial judgment and to the free expression of views on these and other issues, however
controversial."
Dissenting in Pittsburgh Press, MR. JusTCE STEWART
joined by MR. JusTICE DouGLAS expressed the view that
no "government agency-local, state, or federal-can tell
a newspaper in advance what it can print and what it
cannot." !d., at 400. See Associates & Aldrich Company v. Times Mirror Company, 440 F. 2d 133, 135 (CA9
1971) .
We see that beginning with Associated Press, supra, the
Court has expressed sensitivity as to whether a restriction
or requirement constituted the compulsion exerted by
government on a newspaper to print that which it would
not otherwise print. The clear implication has been that
any such a compulsion to publish that which " 'reason'
tells them should not be published" is unconstitutional.
A responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable goal, but
press responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution
and like many other virtues it cannot be legislated.
Appellee's argument that the Florida statute does not
amount to a restriction of appellant's right to speak
because "the statute in question here has not prevented
the Miami Herald from saying anything it wished" 22
begs the core question. Compelling editors or publishers
22

Brief for Appellee, at 5.

..
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to publish that "which 'reason' tells them should not be
published" is what is at issue in this case. The Florida
statute operates as a command in the same sense as a
statute or regulation forbidding appellant from publishing specified matter. Governmental restraint on pub..
lishing need not fall into familiar or traditional patterns
to be subject to constitutional limitations on governmental powers. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S.
233, 244-245 (1936). The Florida statute exacts a
penalty on the basis of the content of a newspaper. The
first phase of the penalty of the compelled printing of a
reply is exacted in terms of the cost in printing and com·
posing time and materials and in taking up space that
could be devoted to other material the newspaper may
have preferred to print. It is correct, as appellee/
contends, that a newspaper is not subject to the finite
technological limitations of time that confront a broadcaster but it is not correct to say that, as an economic
reality, a newspaper can proceed to infinite expansion of
its column space to accommodate the replies that a gov~
ernment agency determines the readers should have
available. 23
Appellant argues that, faced with the severe penalties
that would accrue to any newspaper that published news
a "However, since the amount of space a newspaper can devote to
'live news' is finite, 30 if a newspaper is forced to publish a particular
item, it must as a practical matter, omit something else.
" 39 The number of column inches available for news is predetermined by a number of financial and physical factors, including circulation, the amount of advertising, and, increasingly, the availability
of newsprmt. . ."
Note, 48 Tulane L. Rev. 438,438 (1974) (footnote omitted).
Another factor operating against the "solution" of adding more
pages to accommodate the access matter is that "increasingly subscribers complain of bulky, unwieldly papers." Bagdikian, Fat Newffw
papers and Slim Coverage, Co!umbia Journalism Review, Sept.jOct.
1973, at 19.
2

.•
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or commentary arguably within the reach of the right of
access statute, editors might well conclude that the safe
course is to avoid controversy and that, under the opera•
tion of the Florida statute, political and electoral coverage
would be blunted or reduced. 24 Government enforced
right of access, appellant argues, inescapably "dampens
the vigor and limits the variety of public debate," New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U. S., at 279.
Even if a newspaper would face no additional costs
to comply with a compulsory access law and would not be
forced to to forego publication of news or opinion by the
inclusion of a reply, the Florida statute fails to clear the
barriers of the First Amendment because of its intrusion
into the function of editors. A newspaper is more than
a passive receptacle or conduit for news, comment, and
advertising. ~ The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the
size of the paper, and content, and treatment of public
issues and public officials-whether fairly or unfairly
done-constitutes the exercise of editorial control and
judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised
consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free
press as they have evolved to this time. Accordingly, the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida is reversed.
2

It is so ordered.
See the description of the likely effect of the Florida statute on
publishers, in Lange, 52 N. C. L. Rev., at 70-71.
2
~ "[L]iberty of the press is in peril as soon as the government tries
to compel what is to go into a newspaper. A journal does not merely
print observed facts the way a cow is photographed through a plateglass window. As soon as the facts are set in their context, you have
interpretation and you have selection, and editorial selection opens
the way to editorial suppression. Then how can the state force
abstention from discrimination in the news without dictating selection?" 2 Z. Chafee, Government and Mass Communications 633
(1947) .
24
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